“One cannot fashion a credible deterrent out of an incredible action.”

― Robert McNamara

The Vietnamese Revolution represents one of the most interesting and insightful examples for studying revolutions in the modern era. Namely, the allure of this conflict is due to its somewhat rare revolutionary outcome and the many clear characteristics of the state that preceded its political violence as its revolutionary situation. Consequently, the Vietnam conflict offers valuable conclusions about the nature of revolutionary outcomes, especially as they pertain to theory. In particular, this revolution invigorates the utility of Counterinsurgency Theory and Mao’s Theory of Revolutions. It catalyzes Counterinsurgency Theory by providing several examples of unsuccessful counterinsurgent strategies. Additionally, the Vietnamese Revolution displays the outcome of a conflict when a force painstakingly adheres to Mao’s Theory of Revolutions in order to supplant a ruling power. As such, this prolonged period of political violence in Vietnam holds a strong position in history that is indispensable when analyzing the common features of revolutions.

Overview

Vietnam consists of a long narrow country on the Indochinese peninsula in Southeast Asia. The land consists of heavily forested mountains and plateaus with two major river deltas: the Red River Delta, Near Hanoi, North Vietnam, and the Mekong River Delta, near Saigon, South Vietnam. The country consists of a mostly rural population with about 85% of people concentrated on 20% of the land mass (Defronzo, 2011: p.149). People of Vietnam are mostly ethnic Vietnamese, holding a high percentage of the total population. Culture in Vietnam lived to be heavily influenced by 1000 years of Chinese domination: Confucianism, clothing, writing system, technologies. The language holds a strong Chinese influence. Before the unification in 1802 under Emperor Gia Long, a period of time characterized the country as being a mix of conflicting groups and an inability for unification to occur in Vietnam.

The build to the Vietnamese Revolution began when the presence of the French became more prevalent. The Vietnamese invited the French because of both countries’ interests. The French focused their attention on Christianization and colonization of the Vietnamese people, while Vietnamese gained access to advanced weaponry, technology, and products. Initially, the people of Vietnam tolerated Christianization and colonization; however, this tolerance did not last. Conflict began to arise more frequently between Vietnam and France due to Vietnamese campaigns against Christian missionaries, as well as British gains in China with the overall race of colonization. In 1847, France achieved naval victory and concessions from Vietnam. Then in 1883, after more concessions, the French completed their conquest of Vietnam (Defronzo, 2011: p.152). The French had a great impact: economically, socially, and politically. The Vietnamese economy turned into one that focused heavily on exports and saw an increase in income and land ownership inequality. Additionally, Paul Doumer became known to exploit the populace of Vietnam with the sale of opium (Defronzo, 2011: p.152).  Socially, French teachers and Vietnamese French loyalists taught values of liberty, equality, and fraternity to Vietnamese students, but Vietnamese peasantry continued to suffer under unequal and unfair treatment from the colonial power. In Cao Dai and Hoa, traditionalist religions fought assimilation, and Vo Nguyen Giap became a military icon for the Indochinese Communist Party (Defronzo, 2011: p.155). Politically, the Emperor of Vietnam began to serve only as a figurehead and creation of a Vietnams revolutionary elite took place (Defronzo, 2011: p.157).

During the period of 1883 to 1900, a tradition-based rebellion took place, where rejection of French cultural impositions became more prevalent through cultural resistance and protection. From 1900 to 1925, more organized independence movements occurred and rebellion leaders, Phan Boi Chau and Phan Chu Trinh, gained more support. Phan Boi Chau advocated for the violent replacement of French rule, while Phan Chu Trinh favored a peaceful transition into Vietnamese independence. From 1925 to 1940, The Vietnamese Nationalist Party (VNQDD), Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), and University Rebellion Groups took action. The VNQDD had no official platform on redistribution and prioritized violence that utilized assassinations and small unit attacks. The ICP acted as a good parallel with Mao in China. They made independence from French colonial rule paramount and established the mass organizations network known as the Viet Minh (Defronzo, 2011: p.158-162).

The main revolutionary period came with Ho Chi Minh and the formation of the Viet Minh. Ho Chi Minh, meaning “he who enlightens,” held the title of being the third child in an anticolonial family. He had about 76 aliases used in many political writings and analyses and traveled the world for about 30 years to gain knowledge before coming back to Vietnam. At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, Ho Chi Minh became disillusioned with his desires for peaceful change. There, he established the Viet Minh. The results of World War II had a large impact on the revolutionary period. The Japanese defeat of French on multiple occasions encouraged uprisings. Additionally, Viet Minh expansion due to western support weakened the French global status. In March of 1945, Japan seized French colonial forces, leaving the Viet Minh unimpeded for five months and became the most important period for the ICP. August of that same year, the Japanese surrendered and left a ‘power vacuum’ that drove out French and Japanese influences in Northern Vietnam (Defronzo, 2011: p.166). Consequently, the French military reentered Vietnam to prevent Chinese imperial threats.

The French-Indochina War took place between 1946 to 1954. Primary tactics used in this war included guerilla warfare, simultaneous assaults, and large campaigns on drained areas. During this time, the Viet Minh delayed land redistribution to avoid splitting the base of support. On May 7, 1954, after an unbroken siege, the French finally ceded. After the French ceded, the Geneva Accords took place in Indochina. The Geneva Accord resulted in a split between North and South Vietnam along the 17th parallel. The North became referred to as the Nationalist Communist Viet Minh North and the South as the Nationalist Absolutist Diem Regime South (Defronzo, 2011: p.174). The Geneva Accord also resulted in a compromise despite major victory because they had received little support from Russia and China.

The end of the French-Indochina War led to the United States getting involved in relations with Vietnam. President Ngo Dinh Diem, seeking absolutist rule and a Christian religious extremist, utilized United States resources. A Denunciation of Communist’s Campaign initiated to arrest, detain and torture peacefully transiting Vietnamese communist supporters. Consequently, the National Liberation Front (NLF), or “Viet Cong,” formed with the purpose of reunifying Vietnam. Viet Cong utilized a strategic hamlet program that consisted of the relocation of citizens in an attempt to reduce them as an NLF resource. This tactic became unpopular to peasants and radicalized them against the government in the South. The United States took it upon themselves to intervene in 1965 with the initiation of a bombing raid over North Vietnam. An assumption formed that the Vietnamese would quickly and surely cease to the United States. However, as the Tet Offensive formed, this assumption proved to be false. The Tet Offensive resulted in large amounts of NLF casualties that pushed the United States and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam out of their stronghold areas (Defronzo, 2011: p.181). This, however, did not work as the United States and Army of the Republic of Vietnam regained those strongholds. In the United States, the military involvement in Vietnam caused demoralized support and uprising because the war turned out to be a grave site for U.S. soldiers. The aftermath of the war between the United States and Vietnam led to a peace agreement in 1973 (Defronzo, 2011: p.183). As Vietnam eventually reunified, these peaceful terms became violated. Additionally, Southern Vietnamese loyalists forcefully relocated to “reeducation camps” and the ICP dominated in politics. This time, however, the United States did not intervene once again because of the social unrest brought about the first time around.

Counterinsurgency Theory

Counterinsurgency (COIN) theory is a moving target whose development is rooted in centuries of thought, but Antoine-Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz served as the first major pair of theorists to bring COIN philosophy to the forefront of revolutionary theory. As intellectual rivals, these two theorists had polar opposite approaches to addressing the problem of revolutionary insurgency. During their rise to philosophical prominence, political change (rather than simple combat victory) became a possible function of Guerilla warfare tactics. Consequently, a need to combat the newfound political dimension of insurgency arose. For Jomini, addressing these new tactics required attacking the enemy force directly and completely eradicating opposition through use of superior force. As an approach, the statement, “A war is a war is a war” (Nagl, 2009: p.27), serves as a brief foundational concept for this philosophy. The core of this ideology eventually became known as direct counterinsurgency. With Clausewitz, addressing insurgent forces relied on focusing on the structures that supported them, or as Mao Zedong would define it centuries later, “Separate[ing] the fish from the water” (Nagl, 2009: p.28). Typically, this strategy implies more of a war of ideas between opposing forces over the minds and support of the people, and Clausewitz explained this war of ideas by describing an inter-reliant trinity between the government, the people, and the military (Glascott, 2017). If insurgent forces can maintain the support of the people, they can survive indefinitely and eventually outlast a government of wavering strength. If a current government or administration can sway the support of the people away from insurgent forces, they can quickly exhaust revolutionary capabilities; a concept that eventually developed into the current philosophy of indirect counterinsurgency.

As an extension of counterinsurgency theory Robert Thompson emphasizes five critical principles of counterinsurgency and an accompanying five questions to evaluate the extent to which a revolutionary outcome favors the administration fighting the insurgency. The five principles consist of the government: having a clear political aim, acting in accordance with the law, creating an overall plan, establishing a priority of defeating existing political subversion, and securing its bases during the guerilla phase of an insurgency (Nagl, 2009: p.29). In a mirrored fashion, the five questions that Thompson poses to evaluate counterinsurgent success require assessing the: doctrine and how it achieves national goals, army’s contribution to setting realistic goals, military’s acceptance of subversion to political goals, minimal force required in relation to actual force used, and military structure itself (Nagl, 2009: p.30).

Applying the concepts of direct and indirect counterinsurgency theory to the Vietnamese Revolution can offer explanation and insight into the revolutionary outcomes that followed this prolonged period of political violence. From an overall perspective, both the French and US/South Vietnam approaches to combat insurgency were primarily Jominian and direct. The French regularly demonstrated this direct method in their use of the French Expeditionary Force to combat the guerilla warfare employed by the People’s Army of Vietnam, as well as in their drastic response of decisive military force at the Yen Bay Mutiny and their utilization of decidedly traditional warfare tactics during the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. French Expeditionary Forces rarely responded to Vietnamese aggression with unique or extraordinary measures, which suggests that much of their strategy relied on the assumed superiority of their force. At Yen Bay before the main period of revolution, direct COIN quelled the uprising of the Vietnamese Nationalist Party (VNQDD), which spiraled into political disarray following the decimation of the majority of its upper leadership in the Yen Bay Mutiny (Defronzo, 2011: p.160). However, many of the results of conflicts following this proved the ineffectiveness of France’s direct strategy. This inadequacy became particularly apparent in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, wherein the Vietnamese defeated French forces in a traditional military battle that challenged the original assumption that this colonial power actually had a stronger force (Yu, 2017). Similarly, the United States used direct COIN as its primary method for dealing with the situation in Vietnam following French vacation. The primary tools exercised by U.S. forces included high altitude bombing raids, an exponential influx in troops, air and artillery strikes, search and destroy missions into the jungle, and the use of chemical weaponry (Palmer, 2018). All of which, indicate attempts to destroy the enemy force rather than attacking political motivations, and much like with France, were ultimately inadequate measures that did not defeat the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong). These methods were so ineffective in fact, that they often resulted in radicalization of the local populace against the United States and the South Vietnamese administration.

Despite the clear favor of direct COIN methods for U.S and French forces alike, they still occasionally attempted to attack the Vietnamese uprising and the Viet Cong at their political roots using indirect COIN. One such response that contributed to United States infamy among the local Vietnamese populace, was the forced relocation of Vietnamese peasants into hamlets. Initially an attempt to physically separate the Vietcong from the civilian populations that were instrumental to their sustainment, this strategy backfired because the civilians just continued to support the Viet Cong and allow them into these “loyal areas”(Palmer, 2018). The Combined Action Program, which was an attempt by the United States Marine Corps to integrate with the local populace and teach them how to combat Viet Cong forces, represents another unsuccessful indirect counterinsurgency effort. French and U.S. forces executed many of these indirect COIN endeavors without the proper support or training to really have an impact on the outcome of the conflict and they are aptly described as “portentous” (Palm, 2020: p.180) and too little too late.

With respect to Thompson’s five principles, the courses of action of counterrevolutionary forces fall well short of winning the critical battles identified. The government of South Vietnam was decidedly split between its political goals of either maintaining South Vietnamese independence or pushing for reunification of Vietnam under the South Vietnamese administration (Yun, 2019: p.71). Brutal campaigns spearheaded by President Ngo Dienh Diem like the Denunciation of Communists-an endeavor that involved the murder and imprisonment of many peacefully emigrating Vietnamese-portrayed the willingness of the counterrevolutionary regime to violate laws (Randolph, 2019). Additionally, the exponential escalation of forces over the course of the war signaled that the U.S. continually underestimated the resources required for a counterinsurgent effort, which clearly illustrates the incoherence of United States military strategy from the onset of the conflict (Huei, 2006). Most significantly, the priority of counterinsurgency operations rarely prioritized defeating political subversion over defeating guerillas, and the Tet Offensive proved that government bases and strongholds were not secure (Defronzo, 2011: p.181). Accordingly, the answers to the five questions that Thompson poses when evaluating successful counterinsurgencies are similarly bleak for the Vietnamese revolutions. South Vietnamese doctrine did not achieve national goals. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) did not contribute to the setting of national goals because the external influence of the U.S. often predetermined South Vietnamese military strategy (Leff, 2006). Furthermore, military objectives superseded political goals, the military employed massive force measures with large campaigns, and the military structure of both the ARVN and the United States did not equip or adapt itself well to counteracting the guerilla tactics of the North Vietnamese.

Mao’s Theory of Revolution

Mao Tse-Tung, also known as Mao Zedong, was a revolutionary theorist and leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Born in the late 19th century in Hunan, China, Mao went on to be one of the most influential revolutionaries in human history. In 1921, he started the CCP in Shanghai. China at this time was deeply corrupt, with multiple groups claiming power and fighting for supremacy (Nagl, 2009: p.20). Mao’s new party took advantage of the chaos and began attempting to organize the lower classes into labor unions. After a few losses at the hands of the National Revolutionary Army, he quickly realized that the party needed to focus on rural peasants rather than the urban lower class in order to form a revolutionary force that had a chance against the larger, more dominant contenders in the race for power in China. On the run from the National Revolutionary Army, Mao wrote his book detailing his theory of revolution, Guerrilla Warfare (Nagl 2009: p.21).

Mao’s theory of revolution covers both the indirect and direct forms of insurgency that the Communist army successfully carried out in China. Mao writes not only of how to conduct a successful direct insurgency against an opposing army, but also how to wage the “People’s War” and rally the local populace alongside the troops (Nagl 2009: p.22). Mao viewed political mobilization as “the most fundamental” piece of a victorious army (Nagl 2009: p.23). In a speech compiled in his book On Protracted War, he declares that “the Japanese aggressor, like a mad bull crashing into a ring of flames, will be surrounded by hundreds of millions of our people standing upright, the mere sound of their voices will strike terror into him, and he will be burned to death” (Tse-tung, 1938). This indirect warfare focuses on cultivating relationships with the citizens around the revolutionary force. The “Three Rules and Eight Remarks” were the guidelines Mao set for his army’s conduct among the citizens they encountered (Nagl, 2009: p.22). It reads as a combination of the bill of rights and a cotillion primer, with rules such as “Do not, without authority, search those you arrest” and “roll up the bedding on which you have slept” alongside one another on the list (Nagl, 2009: p.22). Nagl argues that these rules “emphasized to the common people that the Communists were on their side and that the Nationalist armies were not much better than the Japanese” (Nagl, 2009: p.22). Mao’s indirect insurgency allowed the Communist army to win over the hearts and minds of the civilian population for 15 years as they battled the Nationalist army and the Japanese army (Nagl 2009: p.23).

The “People’s War” is indispensable in Mao’s revolutionary theory, but he also writes about the process of revolution in a more direct way. Mao believed that revolutionary war is a meticulous, three step process, which begins with the hearts and minds and ends on the conventional battlefield. In the first step, the revolutionary forces first organize and train their forces, in Mao’s case, the rural peasants (Nagl 2009: p.23). This phase limits military operations and focuses on preparing for the battles of the second phase. This second step is waging small, swift battles against “isolated enemy outposts and patrols” (Nagl, 2009: p.23). These attacks erode the local citizenry’s trust in the government, and more conventionally, allow the revolutionary forces to seize equipment, weapons, and other tools of war to form the “storehouse of the revolution” (Nagl 2009: p.23). Finally, the guerilla fighters take on the government in conventional, large scale battles, using the strength they have gained through their protracted, unconventional warfare. Mao urges revolutionaries to carry out these stages simultaneously when possible, so that continual support from phases one and two aids the open battlefield in phase three (Nagl, 2009: p.23). Through this process, revolutionary armies can recruit members, gather tools, and finally face the government head on over a period of years.

The Vietnamese revolution shares many similarities with Mao’s blueprint. The Vietnamese Nationalist Party (VNQDD) carried out small scale attacks against the French, including assassinations and terrorist attacks, which they believed would drum up support from the Vietnamese citizenry (Defronzo, 2011: p.159). However, this party was pretty much defeated after an attempted mutiny against the French in 1930. When inspecting this revolutionary attempt through Mao’s lens, it becomes clear that the VNQDD skipped the first step of gathering and training the masses, winning hearts, and minds, and establishing themselves as a legitimate force. As a mainly urban movement, they failed to gain the support of almost any of the 90% rural peasant population (Defronzo, 2011: p.159). This created a lack of reinforcement, spirit, and leadership, and the party ultimately fell apart after the French arrested over 1000 party members and put over 80 revolutionaries to death (Defronzo, 2011: p.160). One could reason that if Mao had been leading the party, he would have urged the VNQDD to slow down and take root in the soul of the nation, before attempting to wage large, decisive battles on the colonial forces.

As crushing as the defeat may have been, communist revolution in Vietnam was far from over. In the same year as the VNQDD’s failed mutiny, a few academic, urban Marxist-inspired parties joined forces with peasant revolutionaries to form the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) (Defronzo, 2011: p.160). Opposite to the VNQDD, the ICP consisted of mainly peasant workers, with a small number of urban representation (Defronzo, 2011: p.160). The ICP participated in uprisings during the depression in 1930 and 1931, after a rapid drop in export prices (Defronzo, 2011: p.161). This rapid relative deprivation caused some revolts in rural communities, but the national leaders of the ICP did not support these revolts. Keeping with the first phase of Mao’s revolutionary blueprint, the ICP leadership believed the insurrections were premature, because “most peasants in Vietnam were not yet politically committed to revolution” (Defronzo, 2011: p.161).

Patience rewarded the ICP greatly. By the mid-1930s, a new coalition government formed in France, which included influence from the socialist and communist parties (Defronzo, 2011: p.162). This new coalition released many ICP members from prison, and the party grew until the late 1930s. In 1939, when the French government again tried to crack down on the ICP, much of the party managed to go underground, and escaped imprisonment. This protracted approach allowed for the healthy growth of the ICP, with some members even being elected to city council in very pro-communist regions (Defronzo, 2011: p.162). At this point the ICP had been around since 1930. This time allowed the ICP to flesh out support and slowly grow to be a formidable force in Vietnam. The first stage of Mao’s revolutionary blueprint was in full swing. Ho Chi Minh brought new military and leadership power to the ICP by combining forces with the Viet Minh. This new organization took another step towards mobilizing mass amounts of people, by conglomerating revolutionary organizations and spreading Chinese Communist ideologies to members of both the ICP and the new groups which joined the organizations (Defronzo, 2011: p.165). The ICP quickly absorbed all sorts of organizations and gained mass amounts of new members. Ho Chi Minh centered his movement around independence, and not necessarily communism, and in turn was able to garner an incredible level of public support. Some members even directly opposed communism but viewed the ICP as “the only viable means for establishing an independent Vietnam” (Defronzo, 2011: p.166).

As education continued and the Viet Minh and ICP kept expanding, they began to carry out small scale attacks and assassinations against the French, reminiscent of Mao’s second stage of revolution. These attacks won support from Vietnamese who were directly hurt by the French colonial forces, giving the Viet Minh small victories to boost morale (Defronzo, 2011: p.168). In 1945, French forces, battled back by the Japanese who feared an American invasion, left massive swathes of land open that Japanese forces did not bother to secure (Defronzo, 2011: p.168). For five months, the ICP and the Viet Minh captured six provinces in Tonkin, north Vietnam (Defronzo, 2011: p.168). Their membership kept growing, and by the early 1950s, the ICP had 350,000 men and women under arms (Defronzo, 2011: p.168). By taking 15 years before engaging in mobilization, the ICP was able to fully realize their strength and wait for a perfect time to strike. This is the type of strength that Mao envisioned when he encouraged a protracted grassroots movement alongside direct insurgency.

The Vietnamese Revolution was clearly defined by Mao’s theory of revolution. Leaders such as Ho Chi Minh were able to fully execute his ideas just as they were prescribed and capitalized on the grassroots people’s war to battle back the French and Japanese forces. The Vietnamese leaders who had read Mao clearly believed in patience, building strength, and winning hearts and minds alongside battles. By using the power of small-scale attacks, they built morale and strength. This allowed them to take mass amounts of land and train a formidable number of soldiers to fight for their homeland. Mao’s writings were instrumental to this revolution and allowed the ICP to rectify the issues that led to the VNQDD’s downfall.

Conclusion

The study of the revolutionary outcome of the battles in Vietnam and the milestones in the country’s history that built up to this situation are important to recognize when discussing revolutionary situations because the uprising itself cannot simply be explained by one theory. There are many angles at which a political scientist, or anyone interested in revolutionary theory, can approach the August Revolution and the events preceding it. The many attempts at rebellion within the state of Vietnam display that there is not one single, defined way to lead a revolutionary situation. There are many different pathways that a revolt can take, and that is why it is important to observe and learn from a country that seems to have so many opportunities for political reform.

Another important aspect of Vietnam’s revolution is being able to distinguish the aftermath of such a situation on a country’s society. Not only did the Vietnamese demand change within the political system, but an entire culture shift came with the implementation of this new government. Communism is an ideology that affects a country’s economy, philosophy, and overall government, not to mention that it completely altered Vietnamese international alliances once they completely adopted the system in 1975. This country is one prominent example of how revolutionary outcomes affect much more than just the political operations in a sovereign state.

The counterinsurgency (COIN) theory is important to the study of Vietnam in relation to revolutionary situations because it gives an understanding of what kind of tactics were used to persuade citizens on both sides of the revolt and what the main priorities of these tactics were. The Vietnam war saw a change in war tactics that not even the U.S. military was prepared to fight against, this counterinsurgency theory explains the thought process that went into how the U.S. decided to respond to these tactics and how the Vietnamese went about structuring their strategies. COIN and its connection to the revolutionary situation in Vietnam is able to display how these tactics can relate to past, present or, future rebellions and what kind of responses can generally be expected as the tactics evolve.

Revolutionaries in Vietnam accepted the influence of Mao’s Theory of Revolution from neighboring China and found success. The application of this theory to this time period is significant because it details the events going on around Mao as he continued to develop his theory. Mao’s role in the Chinese communist revolution can explain why he detailed specific events or steps a party must take in order to initiate a revolutionary situation, and the similarities between the two countries in regard to politics and the goals of the revolutionaries can explain why this theory suits the Vietnamese so well. His theory helps detail that some aspects of revolutionary situations may be predictable, which is helpful for future revolutionary theorists, but also explains that just because a situation may meet these requirements, does not mean it will result in the same outcome.

The lengthy Vietnamese revolution is one that will be studied for years to come because of its complexities and ability to validate and test multiple theories within the revolutionary realm. From war tactics to complete changes in culture, this revolutionary outcome was relatively unique, but the events leading to this revolt may not have been as unpredictable as they seem. Studying this duration of time and understanding just how crucial each event was to the revolutionary situation helps highlight that each revolution may be heading the same direction, but no path to true revolutionary change is identical.

Works cited

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Image Attribution

Photograph of Private Fred L. Greenleaf Crossing a Deep Irrigation Canal during Operation Bang Dong by Lafoon, Robert C. , Photographer is within the public domain.