9
“Even an empire cannot control the long-term effects of its policies. That is the essence of blowback.”
― Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire
Chalmers Johnson’s theories nominally emerged following a period of political and social upheaval across the global stage during one of the many periods of acceleration in regard to the Cold War. On top of the many global revolutionary situations to have emerged following the First World War, the Cold War saw a new breakout of both political discourses, with Marxist-Leninism’s ideologies taking the forefront of much of the social and political overturns. The nations representing these ideologies and their offshoots became the primary focus of NATO nations’ defense and foreign policies.
While not the first socialist revolutionary movement, the October Revolution within Russia, led to the creation of the Soviet Republic, later known as it was consolidated before, during, and following the Second World War as the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR). In this capacity, the USSR represented perhaps the greatest existential threat to the western powers of Europe and the Americas. This threat led to the creation of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, existing both as opposing political forces in terms of influence and control. The Cold War represented perhaps the most significant single period of military spending and arms buildup in human history. As the Soviet Union was formed on the ideology of the revolution, and not only internally, but a revolution which was to be exported and brought to the world. Therefore, it is natural that many revolutions characterized the Cold War period.
The Chinese Civil War, having been put on a temporary hold on account of the Second Sino-Japanese War, came to a decisive end in 1949, with the communist leader, Mao Zedong, becoming the leader of the newly formed People’s Republic of China (PRC), and continuing the wartime connection with the Soviet Union which had been in place since before the war with Japan. For as long as Stalin was alive, this relationship was relatively stable, and the two powers were seen as the two principal communist states in the world. On this, China similarly aided in global revolutionary situations, for a time, with Soviet backing. The Korean War arose out of multiple revolutionary situations in the Korean peninsula, which in turn, had their roots in both pre-Japanese occupation strife, as well as post-war insurgency and civil strife.
When reunification became an impossibility, the Korean Peninsula became two nations: the US-aligned Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Soviet-allied Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). With the separation of the Korean Peninsula and the DPRK, the invasion ROK came perhaps the single most explicit example of direct conflict with the PRC and USSR. Having supported the DPRK logistically before, China became directly involved in the conflict in 1950, with forces from the People’s Liberation Army (PRC) engaging US and US-allied troops from then until the cessation of the open conflict. Though never explicitly sending ground troops, the Soviet Union both provided training to the Korean People’s Army (KPA) and directly sent fixed-wing aerial platforms piloted by Soviet personnel, which engaged US forces throughout the conflict. Civil War and a clash between the great powers of the world were but a small step in the course of the Cold War as far as revolutionary situations and their proclivity for inviting intervention by greater powers.
Though a vivid display of arms between the Soviet Union and the United States, Korea would soon be overshadowed by a different conflict similar to a revolutionary situation. The Vietnam War, nominally a civil conflict between the capitalist Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and the communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), came about as a direct result of the earlier Vietnamese Revolution, which resulted in the ousting of French colonial rule over Indochina and creation of the two nations. The Vietnam War, as it was called, began almost immediately following the end of the First Indochina War. Though it is nearly two-decades-long, existence came to redefine the state of US and Soviet foreign policy, as well as the academic literature regarding revolutions.
Amidst the many dozens of revolutions and revolutionary situations that had taken place following the October Revolution, the western literature regarding the topic of revolutions and revolutionaries naturally went through multiple shifts along with global trends and changes. It was amidst this great intellectual upheaval that Chalmers Johnson emerged as a political scientist and scholar. Serving as a Naval Officer during the Korean War, Johnson experienced firsthand the Cold War at its peak, as well as the resolve of the United States’ enemies in the form of PLA prisoners of war, which were transported via the ship on which he served. Following this service, he would attain his advanced degrees at the University of California-Berkeley and become noteworthy for his subsequent works, mainly focusing on China and Japan.
Existing both as a work of political theory and historiography, one of his most notable works, Revolutionary Change, published in 1966 when the Vietnam War was nearing its most extensive period of US involvement, was written directly in the center of much of this socio-political plateau. In this work and subsequent works, Johnson examined both the prevailing theories of revolution and revolutionaries, which had dominated the previous landscape of political theory and science. Crucial to understanding Johnson’s work in this period is understanding other prevailing theories. This was expanded upon in Theories of Revolution, where, among others, Johnson identifies a series of prevailing theories and theory groups, notably actor-oriented theories, and structural theories. Of the latter, he explicitly identifies Theda Skocpol’s work States and Social Revolutions as being an exemplar of a structural theory that colored the intellectual landscape at the time.
For Skocpol, as well as structural theories in general, Johnson points out his belief in both actor-oriented theories and structural theories as equally missing the grand picture of a revolution. In Skocpol’s case, missing the bar on the actual revolution process, which affected the outcome. The three examples used by Skocpol, Russia, France, and China, became the focuses of Johnson’s revolution processes as they focus on revolutionary classes. (Johnson, 1966, p. 175) For China particularly, the revolutionary vanguard, in this case the Communist Party and those of Mao Zedong’s personal circle, exercised control over the revolutionary classes during the revolution and attempted to do so after with mixed results. Revolutionary support by the urban and peasant classes waned in some cases due to increasingly extremist policies by the revolutionary leadership. Consequently, control over the classes became enforced increasingly by the state’s control rather than by ideological security.
Johnson argued this could not be explained merely by looking at the results nor at the individual figures within the revolution. Mao Zedong as a man was undoubtedly important to the Chinese Revolution as Vladimir Lenin was vital to the October Revolution, but looking at the two men does not give a complete intellectual view of either event. The results of the two revolutions, the creation of two new states, the founding of communist bastions in the east, and the beginning of the two great opposition powers to the west, are of great importance to study, but once again do not detail the whole of the matter. Least of all, how the processes altered the outcome within the revolution, these in turn not being wholly related to or owed to the revolutionary leaders.
Much of the Vietnamese Revolution was as driven by internal decision making and individual groups as it was driven by Ho Chi Minh the man, and simply looking at the ousting of French colonial control over Indochina does extraordinarily little to examine exactly how the processes of the revolution created not only the outcome but the nature of the outcome. To this, Johnson presented an alternative. One of the prevailing concepts in Revolutionary Change is the theory as to why humans rebel in the first place and how revolutions form. Wallace’s steps to revolution are mentioned in tandem with this, but perhaps no single portion of the work rings more profoundly than the notion that a nation is immune from revolutions when both the values of a society and the conditions within which it exists are kept in harmony (Johnson, 1966, p. 60).
It is often the case that urban or rural citizens will support or ignore revolutions and revolutionary situations purely due to their security and position. Much of the rural support for the Bolsheviks during the October Revolution came not necessarily due to ideological support, as much as the Bolsheviks represented a form of security and value that was not being represented by the reigning Russian Republic, led by Alexander Kerensky. The Chinese communists during the Chinese Civil War found themselves frequently beaten back by the nationalist Kuomintang, who enjoyed widespread urban support for similar reasons. The Kuomintang had more or less ended a long period of warlordism in China and brought social values and security to many Chinese civilians who would otherwise exist without it. Furthermore, while change naturally precipitates a revolution, it is rarely a neutral or positive change that creates any revolutionary situation. (Johnson, 1966, p. 63) In turn, this came as a reaction to another theorist, that of James Davies, who presented that “The background for political instability is economic and social progress. A populace in a static socio-economic condition is very unlikely to listen to the trumpet or siren call to rebellion. . .. Progress in other words is most of the time a necessary but insufficient cause for violent political change.” (Davies, 1962, p. 350) Simply put, change within a synchronized society does not necessarily create a revolution, while change that desynchronizes that socio-economic sphere can and does.
The Revolutionary Mindset and Formation
As Johnson puts them, the notion of revolutions comes with a particular focus on societal needs and means. In nearly every revolution in history, the government or status quo against which the revolution is aimed has been established and a fixture for some time. The American Colonies were not unaware of the broader British governance of their homelands, yet the revolution occurred in 1775 and not earlier. The question as to why a revolution occurs and when it occurs is central to Johnson’s process-oriented analysis of revolutions and revolutionaries. Back to the concept of immunity, the American colonists, put simply, did not rebel against their colonial ruler earlier because up until the tumultuous period following the Seven Years’ War and the many acts which sparked the revolution, their societal values, and overall status were kept in harmony. Limited autonomy was granted in the form of the colonial government, while disagreements over this indeed existed; as a larger societal situation, both the values that the society held dear and how they existed were secure. The American Revolution began when these ceased to be in harmony as perceived by the revolutionary class.
Similar concepts may be seen in the French Revolution. The French Monarchy did not become unpopular overnight or to a degree to create a revolutionary situation. Years of political and societal turmoil created a situation where ultimately, France’s security and societal values were no longer at a place where the government could guarantee them. Thus, as Johnson further elaborates in breaking the revolutionary process down into three major sections, the revolution begins with social distortion, before there is even a question of violent overthrow, where there is simply a disruption of either the status quo or the societal norm and harmony. (Johnson, 1966, p. 187) This first level is followed by a period in which the revolutionary movement’s exact ideological nature is decided. In the Indonesian National Revolution, the movement took the form of an anti-colonial revolution targeted at Indonesia’s Dutch rulership.
In the American Revolution, this stage was characterized by the previous status quo of the colonies and ideologies quite similar to existing notions of liberty and personal sovereignty, which were viewed as no longer being provided by their previous rulers. In this period of a revolutionary process, the revolutionary movement’s leadership emerges. As Johnson viewed it, the actor-oriented theory was fundamentally flawed in its view of a movement being owed to one man. In this case, the movement creates the man rather than the man creating the movement. Often it is the case that a revolutionary movement or otherwise a societal group of disaffected citizens will find a leader, or a leader will emerge during this period to form a central leadership of a growing movement. Adolf Hitler did not create the ideas of National Socialism from anything. Instead, he took them from existing views held by many dissatisfied veterans of the Great War, such as himself. Hitler did not create the Freikorps that formed the basis for many of his earlier supporters. He did not generate the antisemitic sentiment and betrayal narrative as to what lead to Germany’s disgrace in the war. Hitler merely formed a synthesis around a charismatic persona. The Nazi Revolution, in this case, was formed as a revolutionary group and its leadership and ideology consolidated following the gross disruption of the previous German status quo following the defeat in the First World War.
The final and most overt stage of the revolution, as Johnson outlined it was that of the violent revolution, the step of strategy and tactics, where the revolution reaches a point-of-no-return in that the movement can no longer remain a peaceful one after (Johnson, 1966, p. 191). This stage emerges and forms an ideological crucible of sorts in that the revolutionary leadership, in this case, is now not merely holding heraldship over a social movement but a military one as well. Many of the figures who would characterize the USSR leadership emerged during this period of the Russian Revolution and subsequent Civil War. Just so, many figures found themselves falling out of favor and dispelled from the revolution either during or immediately following this period as a result of the ideological strengthening and absolutism which naturally came about from a victorious vanguard who sought to control the revolutionary class further directly.
In this stage, Johnson provides a form of revolution rarely discussed. That is to say, the Military Coup, a form of revolution that emerges in an enlightened state that is otherwise at a certain societal equilibrium. In this case, the revolutionaries may achieve victory but often at the cost of that same societal equilibrium, subsequently resulting in a similar control. On the other side, it is similarly possible for the anti-revolutionary force to emerge victorious in an entirely socially disrupted nation. At this point, to prevent future revolutions and make up for societal harmony with state force, the population takes on a form of concentration camp, as was seen in Czechoslovakia following the Prague Spring of 1968. (Johnson, 1966, p. 192) It is also worth noting that Johnson’s interpretation of revolutions at this stage also notes the existence of terrorism. Terrorism and terroristic actions are not uncommon at this stage of a revolution, especially when the revolutionary group’s military power is significantly ineffective compared to the counter-revolutionary force.
Therefore, the existence of military power often proves to be the difference in a revolutionary outcome, though not necessarily from peer forces fighting it out conventionally. The forces of the DRV were nominally that of an insurgency force until the end of the Tet Offensive, at which point the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) took over most operations. When considering actions in the Indochina War, Viet Minh forces were far from equaling French ground forces in equipment, training, or organization. However, victory was achieved against France and similarly against RVN and US forces in the subsequent Vietnam war. In this instance, it is not always sheer military superiority that ensures a victory or a defeat for a revolutionary movement as much as it is how the conflict is carried out. The entire concept of indirect counterinsurgency is not to defeat the opposing insurgent force but to make them obsolete by providing security and harmony to the populace that would otherwise support the insurgency. However, direct counterinsurgency is not without failings and has been used quite effectively. The British Army’s use of repression in Operation Anvil effectively ended the Mau Mau rebellion and prevented the chance of it coming about again.
Though the British government did hand over control of Kenya to Kenyan nationalists led by Jomo Kenyatta, Kenyatta himself, despite accusations to the contrary, was never himself directly a member of the Mau Mau insurgency, though he did lionize those who were in his subsequent government. In this sense, the revolution may both fail and succeed based not on simple military superiority but on how the war is conducted regardless of strength or manpower. An understrength and undertrained revolutionary group may defeat a comparatively superior force depending on leadership and how their war is conducted. Additionally, a well-armed, trained, and organized counter-revolutionary force may very well lose if fighting the revolution is not conducted accordingly. Revolutionary war, especially insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare, is frequently a drawn-out and costly affair where people’s support frequently alters the outcome, regardless of any tactical advantage on one side or another (Nagl, 2002, p. 23).
The Revolution and its Continuation
In this sense, the Vietnamese Revolution truly shines as a praxis of Johnson’s work. Ho Chi Minh did not invent the anti-colonial sentiment, nor was it significantly expanded upon by him or his revolutionary leaders, as they did not create what was not already present. An actor-oriented view of the Vietnam Revolution might focus exclusively on Ho Chi Minh or Vo Nguyen Giap, but in truth, the Viet Minh were not formed because they were told to do so by these actors. Following a Japanese occupation in the Second World War, the harmony provided by French rule was lost and not adequately maintained after. This disruption of the social values and living conditions created a desynchronized society. The change had come to Indochina and directly disrupted the existing socio-economic structure and state. While urban elites might have enjoyed the same values and comfort as always or to a slightly diminished degree, it was seen by much of the early supporters of the Viet Minh that their societal values and means of living were no longer guaranteed by or provided by the French government. In addition to this was the already widespread anti-colonial nature of much of Indochina’s peasant class.
As existed in China, communism as an ideology, or at least communism as presented by the revolutionary class, formed a rope by which many societal woes could be bundled to form a mobilizing force among the rural peasantry. (Johnson, 1962, p. 84-85) Much of South Vietnam had been the seat of the French colonial government and naturally formed the basis of RVN political power following the end of French rule. Urban support for the Viet Minh and later DRV was limited, as shown by the far later Tet Offensive. However, this ultimately did not matter so much for the revolutionary leadership. Rural support and peasant mobilization fueled both the conventional and unconventional arm of the DRV military apparatus following the end of the Indochina War. In this capacity, the military formed the basis by which the revolution was concluded. The outcome of Vietnam’s total control by the revolutionary group cannot be taken simply as an outcome but as a result of the revolutionary process. This process was shaped both by the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces.
The US and US military response to the PAVN invasion of the Republic of Vietnam was one which failed to curtail the invasion on the operational stage insofar as that, while tactical situations often fell in favor to the US and ARVN forces, the course of the conflict was one that was not aided by US intervention as much as it was stalled for some time. Militarily, both the guerilla Viet Cong (VC) and conventional PAVN forces maintained peasant mobilization and continued striking into the South despite staggering losses. With the withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam, the revolutionary military force, in turn, acted with the lessons learned throughout the conflict and inflicted a swift and crushing defeat of the remaining counterrevolutionary military and government. While internal strife existed within the DRV politburo and military apparatus, the political stability of the South was comparatively dismal. Subject to change quite frequently and often based entirely on the power of the military, the Republic of Vietnam’s government often failed to provide both military superiorities over the revolutionary forces and failed to provide social security and harmony.
In the end, ARVN forces were defeated, and Saigon fell in 1975. The revolutionary movement originally began to oppose French Colonialism being finally completed as Vietnam’s entirety fell under the Democratic People’s Republic of Vietnam flag. Following the war, the revolutionary leadership exerted control over those classes, which still presented a threat. Thus, the concentration camp-like society as seen in Czechoslovakia was seen in part with many urban elites, particularly those who occupied the recently taken South.
Conclusion
Chalmers Johnson was a political theorist who looked at revolutions as a continuous process that began and ended long before and after all violence had halted. His almost historiographical view of the revolutionary theory created a theory base whereby the circumstance and process behind everything were always taken into account. This led to the creation of a theory of processes and societal movements that can be seen exemplified in the Vietnamese Revolution case study where disruptive change created a desynchronized social situation in Indochina, which spurred a revolutionary movement that became a violent revolution. Similarly, his view of the process of a revolution and the military’s importance to the revolution’s outcome can be seen as exemplified in Vietnam, where both military power and military theory played the decisive role in creating the outcome and conclusion to the Vietnamese revolution. By looking back so as to look forward, Chalmers Johnson created a theory base that examined and analyzed a world where social harmony and social values were often a precious commodity outside of the global superpowers who were frequently called upon to respond to or react to the resulting revolutionary situations. As both a Cold Warrior and as a critic of US foreign policy, Chalmers Johnson and his theories represent the growth and synthesis of political theory in reaction to global revolution and thus will remain relevant for much of the foreseeable future.
Works Cited
Davies, James C, (1962) “Toward a Theory of Revolution” American Sociological Review, Volume XXVII, No. 1 New York, NY
Johnson, Chalmers (1966) Revolutionary Change. Boston, MA: Little Brown and Company
Johnson, Chalmers, (1962) Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press
Nagl, John, (2002) Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press
Skocpol, Theda, (1972) States and Social Revolutions. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1972
Image Attribution
Anti_Vietnam_war_demonstration._Vancouver,_BC._1968 by John Hill is licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0