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“The attitude of the West and of Russia towards a crisis like Ukraine is diametrically different. The West is trying to establish the legality of any established border. For Russia, Ukraine is part of the Russian patrimony.” -Henry Kissinger
The events in Ukraine over the last twenty provide a perfect example of an international component that can often predict revolutionary outcomes. This chapter will analyze the Ukrainian revolutions and counter revolutions that have occurred from the 2000s to the present and how they fit into two revolutionary theories’ confines. The Orange revolution, which upon most accounts, is deemed peaceful, stretched over two years from 2004 to 2005. It involved an alleged attack by their President Leonid Kuchma on a journalist, forcing him not to run for a second time Ukrainian citizens had risen in their disapproval of him. A disputed election between a Russian supported candidate and a western supported candidate followed. The theories applied in this chapter to the Ukrainian revolutions will be those of James Defronzo and Chalmers Johnson. Upon examination, the conclusion can be reached that James Defronzo’s structure-oriented theory of revolution most holistically and accurately explains how these revolutions played out.
To begin to understand the motivations behind, proceedings of, and outcomes up to the most recent Ukrainian Revolution, one must first have at least a grossly simplified knowledge of the last century of Ukrainian history. Their history cannot escape ideological deviance and has had a hard time pursuing its simple goals of developing pro-western relations and eventually pro-western institutions. To begin, Ukraine achieved its independence at two different points throughout the 20th century. The first time, in the 1910’s. Their attempt was undermined by the USSR, foreshadowing a theme of Soviet/Russian opposition to a prosperous and progressive Ukraine. The Soviet Union held strategic control over the country throughout most of the century thwarted their progress towards true independence. Not until the early 1990’s, following the fall of the USSR, did Ukraine again declare real independence and outline a mission to westernize their institutions. Specifically, the country wanted to democratize and liberalize (Contact Ukraine). A weakened Russian state could not initially respond directly to the persistent threat of a NATO-aligned nation on their doorstep. However, the fear, aggravation, and commitment to stopping NATO’s growth still existed (Foreign Affairs). The first decade of true independence was tricky for Ukraine. The nation dealt with two influential spheres, pulling it in two directions: The population aspiring for Western democracy and the Russian regime aspiring to keep it as a de-facto satellite state. Initial interim government President Leonid Kravchuk chose to sway towards Western sympathy, but he was defeated after his first term to Leonid Kuchma (Karatnycky 2005). This period was when Russian influence began to creep back into Ukrainian politics using discrete methods. Despite satisfying both populations to a surprising extent for some time, Kuchma was much more open to the considerations of Russian interests than his predecessor. Corruption eventually became transparent after about a decade. The 2004 election saw another battle of similar names: Viktor Yushchenko versus Viktor Yanukovych, in which Yanukovych initially won. Yanukovych had the prospects of becoming a definitively pro-Russian president of Ukraine.
Upon examination, the election was fraudulent, protests erupted, and the Orange Revolution ensued. Although there appeared to be a positive outlook on the general populace’s election result, it enraged the citizens once the egregious voting fraud came to light. Among some of the more stunning examples of fraudulent behavior were violations of freedoms and threats, even attempts at Yushchenko’s life. The violations of freedoms consisted of government-sponsored news media agencies tormenting Yushchenko without allowing public response and stifling his rallies. The attempts at his life came multiple times, including a truck trying to drive him off the road as well as being poisoned (Foreign Affairs). A vote recount enacted Yushchenko, the opposing Viktor, as president. This unrest furthered the narrative of a country whose population was hungry for the western institutions it kept being deprived of. Although Yushchenko took the reins for a short period of time, Yanukovych eventually grabbed it back over a decidedly fair vote. Although this might appear to be an ideological swing in the populace, it was not and did not mean the populace was gaining back loyalty to Russia as a whole. Yanukovych’s election came with expectations and conditionality that he would maintain Ukraine’s trajectory towards democratization. He failed to follow through on these expectations, which prompted the next Ukrainian Revolution of 2013-2014.
The revolution has since morphed into a Russian proxy war that has resulted in thousands of deaths. However, the initial effort was, in many aspects, a nonviolent success for the pro-western populous. There were around a hundred deaths, but relative to the death toll of many other revolutionary situations, this case was still considered relatively peaceful (Foreign Affairs). The first visual signs of resistance occurred in 2013 with student protests. The protests came after Yanukovych denounced the hope of signing a European association that many in the country wanted and anticipated (BBC). The move, to most citizens, once again foreshadowed a scenario they had seen too many times before: Russia infecting the domestic political sphere to keep Ukraine “eastern” and vulnerable. The protests gained momentum quickly, and as the calendar year changed, more numerous large-scale protests emerged. Soon enough, in 2014, Yanukovych fled the country alongside the Prime Minister. Then the government was overthrown, marking what would at first appear to be the “success” of the pro-western group. However, upon resetting its trajectory once again, Ukraine immediately descended into further turmoil. Russia occupied and then annexed Crimea. Eastern Russian-loyalist regions took note and independently broke off their association with Ukraine leading to about 7% of the state’s land to be under control by Russian special forces and separatists (NBC news). While that percentage may appear low, its meaning pertains to Russian resistance as a critical component of the revolutionary situation. With Russia looming aggressively, Ukraine must balance its genuine prospects with its strategic quelling of Russian interference. Additionally, Ukraine president Poroshenko decided to counter Russian propaganda with hardline censorship. This move deviated from the country’s alleged commitment to western practices. It weakened a considerable portion of the population’s faith in their president, thereby probably weakening their chances in the war (Foreign Affairs).
As with all other revolutionary situations, however, reasoning and process are vital for developing an adequate understanding of what happened. Furthermore, reference to theories and historical academia is essential in each revolution. This helps determine which ones fit most logically to the situation and, therefore, carry the most weight when analyzing other revolutionary situations. Two of the most prominent initial approaches to this analysis are structural theories and actor-oriented theories. Structural theories emphasize the influence of a society’s functional and hierarchical conditions that motivate revolutionary outcomes. In contrast, actor-oriented theories focus more on the person or persons’ traits that motivate these outcomes. Examples of structural conditions include factors like middle-class size and economic or ethnic indifferences. An example of an actor-oriented condition may be the characteristic of a revolutionary that allows him or her to garner a populace’s support. The theorists that will be referred to in this paper are James Defronzo and Chalmers Johnson, with Defronzo representing the structural point of view and Johnson representing that of a hybrid one that includes actor-oriented elements.
Defronzo’s theory is structured around five specific phenomena deemed vital for the insurgent group’s success in a revolution. Four of these are seemingly tailored to explaining pre-revolutionary conditions, with one involving conditions determined during the movement. The first of these five qualities are the growth of displeasure and discontentment among most of the population. This is true of the crisis in Ukraine (Defronzo, 1991a: p. 12-13). Most of the population, mainly those on the western side of the country, are not fond of Russia’s influence and want to grow a strong relationship with its western neighboring countries, as they have for some time. There are groups in Ukraine that remain loyal to the old Soviet regime and the old institutions, including large numbers of ethnic Russians which creates the Ukrainian/Russian Divide within the country. Still the 7% representing all the nation’s land during this crisis is very indicative because the number includes both the annexed area of Crimea and previously domestic populations that willingly chose to break away from Ukraine. That is to say that the populace of the country that is not receptive to a revolution could be easily visualized for the most part geographically (NBC news).
Defronzo’s second precondition is that elite members of the society are alienated from the current government or have positive support for the revolution. This characteristic lacks in many revolutionary situations, often since elites benefit from the flawed government, causing lower classes to revolt. Nevertheless, Ukraine serves as an example of one in which a handful of elites, ethnic Ukrainians, did defect. The revolution has been a domestically popular one, and its participation from the citizens has grown to a tremendous amount. More participation meant more people, friends, and family known on a personal level by elites in Ukraine. This, combined with the fact that the insurgent citizens revolted in a mostly peaceful fashion, is probably the two biggest reasons elites leaked reasons to support counterinsurgency and supported the revolutionary movement (Foreign Affairs). Following this condition, Defronzo states the importance of a unifying formation of motivations that can tie together varying social classes. Again, this is positively relevant to the crisis in Ukraine. The first student protests were motivated by one single event: the denial of European association by former president Yanukovych. As the movement gained momentum, more began to show support for it domestically for the same reasons as the first students. People joined for different reasons, but this does not break alignment with Defronzo’s theory as he strategically left out, identifying unifying motivations as all similar. He further said that these motivations could be completely personal and subjective (Defronzo, 1991a: p. 17). This should not be mistaken as a tenet of actor-oriented theories, in any case.
An actor-oriented promotes these personal characteristics as ones used to motivate others to join. In this case, they motivate the single subject to join in the broader structural revolution. These personal motivations in Ukraine surely emerged in the initial condition where friends and family of elites began participating. The final precondition out of Defronzo’s five overall phenomena is that the crisis weakens the government regarding their ability to administer current policies and deceive their citizens (Defronzo, 1991a: p. 13). This is where it gets complicated for the situation in Ukraine. The protests threw the government into turmoil; it overthrew the government altogether and drove Yanukovych to flee. However, it did not rid them of coercion. In response to Russian propaganda post-Ukrainian Revolution, the new president Poroshenko has installed brute censorship practices. Examples included cutting Russian media and social media and penalizing anti-corruption activists in his own country. Remember, although this revolution ensued on the surface because of Yanukovych’s decision, the frustration had been boiling for years and years due broadly to Ukrainian citizens wanting to westernize. Not only is this overt censorship not in line with the western reasoning behind the revolution and the reasoning for Poroshenko to hold power in the first place, but it got direct condemnation from the people and organizations of western countries, countries that Ukraine is theoretically trying to partner up with ideologically. The author of one article on the current situation in Ukraine contends that just as much as the country needs help against Russia, they also need help against “Kiev’s imitation of Democracy” (Karatnycky). As this can be viewed as a detachment of Ukraine’s revolution from Defronzo’s theory, it can just as equally not be viewed that way. Defronzo would argue that the second Yanukovych fled, it meant a confirmation of this condition, and that the newly fabricated issues are the problem of a new government. Therefore, these issues exist in a new revolution if it came to that again. His fifth specific phenomenon, but not necessarily a precondition, is the presence or non-presence of foreign intervention. It is not simply whether other countries interfere, but rather how they do. For example, a foreign country could intervene in ways that are either beneficial or detrimental to the insurgent group.
Alternatively, they could have not intervened, which could also prove either beneficial or detrimental. Foreign intervention could have happened at any point during the timeline of a revolution. There are undoubtedly preconceived reasons why Russia would want to or would not want to interfere in a foreign revolution, both domestic and dependent on the revolutionizing nation. However, undoubtedly, things could happen during the revolutionary process that would influence a foreign country in one direction or the other. Ukraine has received help from foreign entities, mostly European. This means that most of the aid has been pro-western and, therefore, pro-insurgency. Nowadays, the aid mostly serves to defend against Russia, such as the United States’ hundreds of millions of dollars since 2014. However, the fact that it is coming from western entities indicates their desire to help Ukraine solidify its democratic institutions (CSIS). Defronzo eventually adds to his five phenomena a chiseled down equation for effective rallying movements: nationalism plus a sentiment of egalitarian distribution (Defronzo, 1991a: p. 17). The Ukrainian Revolution makes sense when viewed through the lens of his theory.
As opposed to Defronzo, Chalmers Johnson adopts a more hybrid approach to analyzing revolutionary situations. Johnson begins his work by admittedly stating that it is mostly a response to literature from the latter half of the 20th century. He groups revolutions into four overall categories, with the first two consisting of said actor-oriented and structural theories. He does so after he cites flaws in the first two theories. Johnson thinks that actor-oriented theories alone are not enough to explain revolutionary outcomes but are still crucial in the analysis because they can explain things that structural theories fall short on. The two theoretical groups that he added are conjunction theories and process theories. Conjunction theories are Johnson’s “hybrid” form. As the name suggests, they combine tenets of analysis from structural theories and actor-oriented theories to offer a more holistic and accurate rundown of why the revolutionary situation ensued in the way it did (Johnson, 1966a: p. 170-171). In other words, Chalmers Johnson thinks that structural theories mistakenly leave out the human element and that actor-oriented theories mistakenly overemphasize it. Now looking at this in the context of revolutions, Ukraine has had structural flaws contributing to their insurgent motivation over the past hundred years, including the 2013-14 revolution. The structure of the country has sort of embodied a national cognitive dissonance. It is a country that has had domestically favorable support of democratization but has not been able to fulfill this vision due to its geopolitical circumstances. Russia remains on its doorstep, peaking through the windows and often metaphorically stepping inside to try to change policy through incentivizing Ukrainian leaders. After the revolution, they made this step inside more literal with their annexation of Crimea.
To summarize this point, Ukraine’s structure boils down to a never-ending pull between Russia and western civilization represented by the EU, a pull that has forever burdened its citizens. On the actor-oriented side of the conjunction, theory lies former president Yanukovych. He is no “Great Man”, and he did not even positively create the motivation for the revolution. Rather, Yanukovych is an actor orienting this revolution due to his flaws and the disdain that his citizens had for him. He did rally and motivate an insurgent group to satisfy the idea of an actor working alongside a structure, but he did not do so out of his own accord. In addition to proposing conjunction theories, Chalmers Johnson also emphasized the importance of process theories. He thinks it is too often overlooked when trying to determine why a revolution was successful. Process theories are built on the belief that what happens in a revolutionary situation and how the insurgent group reacts to it is pivotal for the outcome. This may seem somewhat obvious, yet so many theories focus so much on the preconditions that lead to initial dissatisfaction. Johnson cited Lenin as an example of a revolutionary who found success due to his insurgency’s flexibility (Johnson, 1966a: p. 185). It is unclear how relevant this point is to Ukraine, however. The citizens demonstrated a linear peaceful protest method and ultimately achieved their goal in the short term. The protests did grow but did not vary too much in manner.
The Ukrainian Orange Revolutions and the somewhat on-going troubles within the state represent an interesting modern case where different theoretical stances can be applied. This chapter used the theories of James Defronzo and Chalmers Johnson to view these revolutionary situations through a structural lens and actor-oriented perspective, respectively. After application and analysis of both, Defronzo’s structural theory more adequately explains this outcome. While Johnson puts forth some actor-oriented factors that can fit into the Ukraine crisis, it more easily works in conjunction with Defronzo’s five phenomena. The revolution represented a growth of frustration from much of the populace, alienated insurgent-supportive elites, weakened government administration, and choices by foreign nations that favored a revolutionary outcome to occur.
Works Cited
“Brief History of Ukraine since Independence – 1990 to Present: Contact Ukraine.” Contact Ukraine, July 29, 2016. https://www.contactukraine.com/about/ukraine-since-independence.
“Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault.” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2014. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault “Ukraine Crisis.”
Karatnycky, Adrian. “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2005.
Chenowith, and Stephan. “Drop Your Weapons.” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2014.
“Ukraine’s Stalled Revolution.” Foreign Affairs, June 29, 2017.
“Not Contributing Enough?” A Summary of European Military and Development Assistance to Ukraine Since 2014 | Center for Strategic and International Studies. Accessed November 23, 2020. https://www.csis.org/analysis/not-contributing-enough-summary-european-military-and-de velopment-assistance-ukraine-2014.
DeFronzo, James. “Chapter 1: Social Movements and Revolutions.” In Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Perseus Books Group, 2015.
Johnson, Chalmers. Essay. In Theories of Revolution, 169–94, n.d.
Talmazan, Yuliya. “Maidan Massacre Anniversary: Ukraine Remembers Bloody Day of Protests.” NBCNews.com. NBCUniversal News Group, February 20, 2019. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/maidan-massacre-anniversary-ukraine-remembersbloody-day-protests-n973156.
Image Attribution
“’22:22′ or 6 hours before bloody crackdown of students Nov 30, 2013.” by Visavis.. is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0