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“We cannot have equilibrium in this world with the current inequality and destruction of Mother Earth. Capitalism is what is causing this problem and it needs to end.”
— Evo Morales
Bolivia, like many countries in Latin America, experienced revolutionary movements that changed the political institutions and systems in place forever. A unique aspect of the revolutions that took place in Bolivia is the mobilization of Indigenous populations to get involved in the electoral system and social movements. Indigenous populations for years had little to no political power in Bolivia, but all that changed due to Evo Morales and his control of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party. Historically, revolutions in Bolivia were born out of citizens being frustrated with their government and certain neoliberal economic policies that benefited few and hurt many. It can be difficult to explain why revolutions happen, and how to measure their outcomes. Due to the dedication and scholarly work of James Defronzo, there is some explanation as to why these revolutions happened in Bolivia. Collective frustration and citizens being passionate about making their political system more just propelled these revolutions forward. Revolutions in Bolivia have been mobilized by people with little power, but they were able to make historical change.
Starting in 1932, the Bolivian government made it their goal to reclaim land previously lost during a war with Chile; however, it was Paraguay who were currently using the land as a farming area. For this reason, the Paraguayan government would not allow Bolivia to reclaim their lost land. This led to a war between the two countries and resulted in Paraguay holding onto the land. Not only did this devastate Bolivians for they had lost more land than they started with, but 100,000 soldiers were killed in the process. The people, losing trust in their government, began creating the Revolutionary National Movement (MNR) party.
The MNR party led a coalition putting a heavy focus on Indigenous communal rights, which brought a large following. The organization became prominent in politics, ultimately taking over by 1943. Soon after, Bolivian society began to change. The party provided arms to civilians for their own personal protection, disposed of literacy requirements for voting, and established the National Labor Federation. While the growth of the MNR party appeared to be a turning point in society, there is persistent pushback from opposition groups. Following the 1951 election, in which the MNR party won, their power continued to be compromised. After not winning a clear majority of the vote, General Hugo Ballivian and his military junta ruled the victory invalid. In response, civilian-led armed militias began to rise around the country (Otherwise known as the COB 4 Prominent Bolivian Military during the mid-20th century). Served as president from 1951-1952 members of the national army turned against their leadership. Fights quickly broke out in La Paz over a span of a few days, the military junta was forced to surrender. This short conflict cements the results of the 1951 election and proves to be a precursor to future uprisings.
For the following three decades, Bolivia remained relatively stable; however, their political stability did not overshadow growing grievances within the country. Starting in 1985, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank began to implement loan policies within the country, and these neoliberal policies drove the privatization of many Bolivian institutions. While privatization turned out to be a net benefit for the wealthy elites of Bolivia, it did little to help the impoverished majority. In fact, privatization only led to greater levels of resentment towards the government. Growing unrest reached new heights in 1999 when Sociedade de Investimento e Gestão, a municipal water supply company, took over the water industry in Cochabamba. SEMAPA’S policies increased the water prices drastically and forced the people to get government-issued licenses to collect their own rainwater. The privatization of water had pushed the Bolivian people to their breaking point.
While the privatization resulted in escalated prices, it also marked the beginning of a new revolutionary situation, the first water war. On February 4, 2000, thousands of Bolivians took to the streets protesting SEMAPA. These protests were met with an equally large police force. For two days, protesters and police battled in the streets, leading to numerous arrests and injuries. This resulted in Bolivia declaring a ‘state of siege’ (McFarren, 2000). This declaration gave police power to detain protesters without a lawful warrant and shut down group gatherings. While they thought this would subdue protesters, it only worsened conditions. Protests had begun to take place all over the country and as they increased, the government’s ability to keep order began to dwindle. Ultimately, this led to the de-privatization of the water industry.
The water wars may have ended in a victory for the people, but another issue quickly arose when Gonzalo “Goni” Sánchez de Lozada, the President, began exporting large quantities of cheap natural gas to the U.S. This subsequently led to a gas shortage and gave Bolivians a reason to label him as a ‘pawn of the United States’. Once again, violent protests erupted. Protests began to blockade major roads making it difficult for gas exports to travel across the country. In addition, Bolivians demanded Goni’s resignation. Goni’s initial response to the protest is similar to previous leaders, where the military is sent in for intervention, but only intensifies the conflict. Civilians were killed with 60 Pershings in a single protest in El Alto (Farthing 2016). Goni realized his aggressive strategy was failing, forcing him to halt exportations. Initially Goni thought this might curtail public animosity, but the deaths caused irreversible damage to his political career. Goni was forced to flee to the U.S. under impending charges of mass murder.
Sanchez de Lozada’s demise would make way for the rise of Indigenous leader Evo Morales. Before his run for the presidency, Morales had already gained a following from his fight to maintain coca production going against the U.S policies attempting to eradicate it. In addition to fighting for the production of coca, Morales ran on a platform of nationalization. He pledged to nationalize the gas, oil, and communications industries. In the 2005 election, Evo Morales, part of the MAS party and the first Indigenous candidate running, was declared President of Bolivia. Shortly after Morales took office, a constituent assembly convened during which a new constitution was written. In 2009 the new constitution was put into practice cementing Bolivia’s revolutionary outcome.
Today, the revolutionary situation seems to have reignited. Evo Morales the once popular revolutionary leader was forced to flee Bolivia after protests erupted over a potentially illegitimate election. However, the MAS party regained power in the most recent election. While the MAS party has held power for over a decade, many people within the country believe their reign should end. Moreover, the election victory for the MAS party has allowed Morales to return to the country. Due to the controversy surrounding Morales, his return will likely be divisive. The country could see the continuation of protests and civil unrest that took place when Morales was still in power. Following the ratification of the 2009 constitution, Bolivia had seemingly ended their revolutionary situation, but with the MAS party regaining power and Evo Morales coming back to the country Bolivia’s revolutionary outcome remains ongoing.
Stages of a Revolution
In chapter one of Explaining Social Revolutions: Alternatives to Existing Theories, James Defronzo outlines critical factors that drive social and revolutionary movements. Within this chapter, Defronzo states that:
It is likewise too apparent to everyone that revolutions proceed through struggles in which organized political parties and factions are predominantly involved, [a]nd it is recognized that they culminate in the consolidation of new state organizations, whose power may be used not only to reinforce socioeconomic transformations that have already occurred but also to promote further changes (Defronzo, 1991, pg. 12).
For this process to occur, revolutionary situations progress through five distinct stages. First, a society’s intellectuals turn against the previously supported regime, followed by the old regime’s attempts at reform in order to prevent revolutionary situations from failing. The third stage is marked by internal conflict within the revolutionary group attempting to overthrow power. The fourth stage notes that the post-revolutionary government is moderate. The fifth and final stage indicates the moderate government fails and radicals take power (Defronzo 1991).
Defronzo’s first stage of revolution- a society’s intellectuals turn against the previously supported regime- directly relates to the 1998 formation of the MAS political party. The MAS party and its leaders represent Bolivia’s politically left intellectuals (Defronzo 1991). The party serves as “another expression… [of] discontent with the neoliberal governments” (Shoaei, 2012, 38). Finally, the MAS and its dissident intellectuals would gain the teeth needed to be a legitimate force after gaining the support of Indigenous people. The foundation of the MAS party and its alliance with Indigenous people form a common enemy of the Bolivian government’s neoliberal policies and widespread privatization (Webber, 2005, 2-3). Their rise to power and the growing civil unrest of Indigenous communities leads into Defronzo’s second stage, and the need for governmental reform.
Defronzo’s second stage of a revolution says that the old regime’s attempts at reform in order to prevent revolutionary situations fails (Defronzo 1991). The first attempt at change was led by President ‘Goni’ Sanchez de Lozada after the Water War in 2000. As a result of protests over privatization of Cochabamba’s resources, the government promised to review the situation (Schultz, 2003, 35). After there was a failure to act, protests escalated and the revolutionary groups’ demands increased from simply lowering water prices to complete nationalization (Schultz, 2003, 35). Ultimately, Goni’s failure to act haunted his political career. In 2003, during the first Gas war, Goni’s yet again faced with civil unrest and mass protests. His slipping capacity to govern resulted in fleeing the country (Webber, 2005, 4). This marked the beginning of a dispute within the government.
The third stage of revolution included that there is typically an internal conflict in the organization that is attempting to take control of power (Defronzo 1991). For Bolivia, this meant addressing the oppression and prejudice against Indigenous groups. The central problem with trying to gain political power whilst still actively facing barriers placed by the government required them to generate a loud enough voice for those inequalities to be heard. Indigenous groups faced discriminatory laws banning voting, having access to natural resources, and growing specific plants that surrounding communities relied on (Wood 2019). With stark social differences, there was a necessity for mass protests to be well-organized and aggressive enough for recognition as legitimate and equal.
Defronzo’s fourth stage of revolution notes that in the beginning, the post-revolutionary government’s moderate (Defronzo 1991). During Black October in 2003 and the second Water War in 2005, citizens stopped the economy to object to the neoliberal government selling newly found natural gas deposits to the US, prompting protestors to block entire streets. As the President continued to order violence against his own people, activists countered their force and demanded for him to step down. Though he actively denied it prior, Sanchez de Lozada resigned from office and was replaced by Carlos Mesa. Mesa continued Goni’s economic and social policies leading into the second Water War. The protesters’ main goals were the “naturalization of gas, the shutdown of parliament as a show of popular force and determination, the renunciation of Mesa, older themes of the October agenda like holding a trial for Goni, and primarily focusing on the dignity of the citizens” (Goldstone, p. 11). New waves of protests plus the growing support of numerous groups within the country created a re-birth of social movements. Over half a million people hit the streets, many of whom walked from El Alto to La Paz and engaged in street battles with the police. In June of that year, President Mesa resigned, meaning the government went through the line of succession to find a replacement. Eduardo Rodriguez, the chief justice of the Supreme Court, was sworn into office (Webber, 2005, 8). His position was seen as moderate because of his unanimous support from Congress and willingness to compromise with Indigenous groups and search for bipartisan support. Under his Presidency, there was a condition of holding elections within one year of being sworn in. With little plans for his time in office as well as being the ‘placeholder’ for the next candidate, the election was moved to 2005 and Morales eventually became President (Webber, 2005, 9).
The fifth stage of revolution proclaims once the moderate fails, more extreme leaders seize control (Defronzo 1991). Evo Morales and the MAS party granted Indigenous people the voice and power necessary for change. Morales’ amplification of their rights and struggles put them on the map nationally, while simultaneously continuing to fight for citizen rights in regard to possessing their own lands and resources. His involvement prior to his Presidency exemplifies conflicts leading to his success. This begins first, with moderate views coinciding with a focus on naturalization and human rights, and then evolving into more radical viewpoints and policies. In efforts of creating a post-revolutionary government, his main focus shifts onto eradicating the neo-liberal regimes that had previously ruled for decades. Many communities were growing frustrated with how the government prioritized profit over life, which in turn, brought out increased bipartisan support, starting with a moderate approach that connects to Indigenous populations, coca farmers, and the lower economic class. Since Bolivia’s population primarily consists of these groups, his success is heightened by civil unrest and desire. Arguably, despite Evo Morales and the MAS party not achieving formal power yet, they proved capable of dictating the government’s actions.
Guerilla Foco and the Bolivian Revolution
Che Guevara’s Foco theory can be aptly applied to the Bolivian revolution, and more specifically, the social unrest beginning in 2000. Che Guevara’s theory of revolution consists of three fundamental aspects (Guevara, 1960, 47). First, the corruption of capitalism creates the conditions for revolutions. Second, partisan warfare coupled with psychological warfare produces a successful revolution. And finally, the third aspect consists of Guevara’s three lessons of revolutionary movements. Those lessons in order; popular forces can win a war against the army, not all necessary conditions for a revolution must be met, the insurrection can create them, and finally warfare must take place on favorable ground (Guevara, 1960, 65). Working through the steps backwards assists with explaining the Bolivian revolution.
Guevara’s third lesson is that the warfare of the insurrection must take place on favorable ground. The warfare during Bolivia’s revolutionary situation, if it can be called warfare, took place in urban areas, and thus served as the favorable ground. The two main urban areas of the Bolivian revolutionary situation were Cochabamba and La Paz. Both partisan and psychological warfare waged by the Bolivian protestors were conducted via strikes and blockades. Moreover, the partisan warfare, the warfare against the enemy, directs at the Bolivian government with Gonzalo “Goni” Sanchez de Lozada serving as the government’s president. The Bolivian protestors successfully waged psychological warfare through their widespread social unrest. According to Guevara, this would be supplemented via the urban setting (Guevara, 1960, 77). Most importantly the urban setting allowed the indigenous people to paralyze the industrial portion of Bolivia’s economy by implementing widespread general strikes and road blockades (Schultz, 2003, 35). Paralyzing Bolivia’s industrial sector proved successful during both the gas and water wars. The urban setting would prove to be the favorable ground for the revolutionary situation and was conducive to the revolutionary conditions.
The favorable ground for the Bolivian revolutionary situation would prove to fulfill Guevara’s second lesson that not all necessary conditions need to exist for a revolution to occur, but the insurrection can create them. The two main unfavorable conditions for the Bolivian revolutionaries were battles not occurring on traditional favorable ground and the government coming to power through a popular vote (Guevara, 1960, 48). As noted, the primary warfare of the revolutionary situation took place in Cochabamba and La Paz. However, this is not Guevara’s favorable ground. He insists the countryside should be the “basic area” for revolution, though this was not possible for Indigenous people, who make up most of the revolutionary force (Guevara, 1960, 47). This is for two reasons; First, Indigenous people were not armed, and instead had to find other ways to inflict damage against the Bolivian government. Second, the people would have been unable to address their cause for revolution- the privatization of Bolivia’s natural resources. Yet, without the jungle setting being an option, the insurrection created its own favorable ground: urban centers.
The revolutionary situation successfully overcame the obstacle of the government’s legitimacy (achieved via popular election) by forcing the resignation of the President. The blockades and strikes demonstrated Goni’s “absolute incapacity to govern through consent” (Webber, 2005, 4). Goni would ultimately flee the country in 2003, allowing Goni’s vice president Carlos Mesa to assume power. However, Mesa would continue to push Goni’s neoliberal policies and the privatization of Bolivia natural resources (Webber, 2005, 4). As a result of the continuous protests in Bolivia widening in 2005, the second water and gas war began. This prompted President Mesa to resign from his position, allowing for new presidential elections to be held (Webber, 2005, 7). Indigenous people were then able to elect Evo Morales, one of the key leaders of their movement, as President by popular vote.
Finally, Indigenous groups won their political war after creating all the necessary conditions for revolution. According to Guevara, “the capitalist system (is) destroyed by its own contradictions” (Guevara, 2005). In the case of Bolivia, these contradictions or corruptions are marked by the implementation of neo-liberal policies. These policies resulted in the privatization of national resources and harmed the ones who are supposed to be benefiting from increasing water and electricity prices to the destruction of the national train system (Shultz, 2003, 34). The people responded by calling for the re-nationalization of their once public resources, and eventually, the citizens achieved their goals. President Evo Morales appeased the people’s demands and nationalized their natural resources once again.
The corruption of capitalism in Bolivia manifested itself through neo-liberal policies which resulted in privatizing the country’s natural resources, thus showing the cause for revolutions theory to be successful. The Indigenous people used the country’s urban centers and favorable ground for ‘warfare’ conducted through strikes and blockades. These protests overcame hostile conditions for revolution, like facing a popularly elected leader, by forcing the President’s resignation. Finally, the people achieved success through the election of Evo Morales, who re-nationalized Bolivia natural resources.
The Mark Evo Morales Left on Bolivia
The highly anticipated 2020 Bolivian election marked a significant turning point in government and global interest. The Movement for Socialism Party (MAS), which for many years was led by Evo Morales, was able to win the election. This election and transition of power back to the MAS party came at a crucial time. In 2019, a turbulent, alleged-illegitimate election process declaring Morales victorious resulted in thousands of protestors taking to the streets. Evo Morales later resigned and fled the country, leaving the highest office in Bolivia vacant. Shortly after Morales’ resignation, Jeanine Anez was granted the Presidency and a new conservative government held power in Bolivia.
This was not an easy transition from the MAS party to a conservative leadership, therefore this government was met with opposition and political unrest. The lack of a bipartisan relationship between the interim government and the people led to devastating consequences once COVID-19 reached Bolivia. Jeanine Anez had corruption scandals levied against her, creating mistrust between her and the citizens. Anez’s response to the Coronavirus pandemic was unpopular and highly contested by medical professionals. “Anez is not recognized as a legitimate leader, which makes it extremely difficult to coordinate a complex response that the pandemic requires” (Trigo, 2020). Bolivians suffered through high cases and high death tolls. The people wanted a chance to choose their own government and it was finally time for the elections to be held.
Protests continued to break out because the interim government used the coronavirus as reason to delay the election. Many people in Bolivia saw this as an attempt to continue holding power. “Nearly 150,000 miners, labor unionists, coca leaf farmers and Indigenous activists took to the streets last week after the national electoral council delayed the presidential election for the second time” (Faiola, 2020). The time finally came for the people of Bolivia to choose their next President, and the MAS party came out victorious.
After a year of being exiled from his home country, Evo Morales returned to Bolivia to celebrate the MAS parties’ success and was welcomed with both glee and suspicion from supporters and political allies. Morales’ controversial return shows how he is still a beloved figure to the citizens. Upon his return, Morales was greeted by an 800-vehicle convoy that led through the regions of Bolivia that aided him in gaining power and notoriety. “For Morales, 61, the homecoming is a chance to celebrate a remarkable political revival by Mas and make a powerful statement about his own political relevance in a profoundly symbolic region”29 (Phillips, 2020). Morales still remains an integral part of the political identity of Bolivia and still holds a lot of support from the people of Bolivia.
There was clear support across the population, “but many, even within Morales’ party, are thought to be uneasy about the reappearance of a charismatic but deeply divisive figure” (Phillips, 2020). Bolivia was already experiencing high levels of political tension due to the timing of the election, and some feared what Morales’ return would do. Even though Morales had made a triumphant return to Bolivia, there was now a new leader of the MAS party.
Luis Arce, who was handpicked by Evo Morales to take over the MAS party, won primarily with his leadership qualities. Arce’s inauguration was a large event and many celebrated his win and showed their support. For Arce and the people, him winning symbolized a shift back to democracy. Arce stated, “we have reclaimed democracy for Bolivia, and our message is that we will not tolerate any kind of de facto dictatorial regime or coup in Latin America” (Phillips, 2020). The interim conservative government put in power after Morales fled the country in 2019 was picked by the Senate, not voted in by the people. Therefore, after the lack of an adequate response to COVID-19 and accusations of corruption, people were ready to vote this government out.
The government was no longer in power and Luis Arce was now able to start leading the country during a polarizing time and a raging pandemic. While Arce and the MAS party do have a lot of support from the Bolivian people, there is a growing movement of opposition by right-wing and conservative groups against them. Days before the inauguration, people went on strike due to the belief that the results were fraudulent. “Several hundred right-wing protesters in Santa Cruz called on the armed forces to mobilize to prevent Arce’s Movement for Socialism (MAS) party from assuming power. (MercoPress, 2020). While this was not an exceptionally large movement against Arce, it shows the continually growing resistance. These groups, inspired by Luis Fernando Camacho (Creemos), hit the streets in protest.
Camacho, who has long opposed the MAS party and even led protests against Morales in 2019, has become an influential figure for conservative groups in Bolivia. Camacho single handedly created an anti-Morales movement in Bolivia that continues to gain continual support. This began after the 2019 election, where Camcaho began his attack on Morales and the MAS party. “Camacho argued that Morales should resign for clear authoritarian overstep—a claim bolstered by the fact that, by running for a fourth term in the first place” (Nugent, 2020). Morales’ attempt to stay in power fueled the opposition groups and continue to plague the legitimacy and integrity of the MAS party. This attempted power-grab by Morales stained the MAS party and inspired opposition groups to protest the election results.
Bolivia has long dealt with regime change ranging from military dictatorships to left wing socialist parties. Now that Bolivia has swung back into left socialist control, it begs the question; will these right-wing opposition groups continue to grow? Does it have the potential to be a large-scale new social movement in Bolivia? According to Guevara, “when the forces of oppression come to maintain themselves in power against established law, peace is already broken” (Guevara, 1960, pg. 48). These conservative groups believe that the MAS party is attempting to stay in power by tampering with election results, assuring a MAS party win. However, there is no concrete evidence of fraudulence and the MAS party has campaigned itself on the side of democracy, but right-wing groups continue to fight.
An important thing to continually examine is if the right-wing groups continue to grow and what impact that will have on Bolivian politics. According to the stages of revolutions articulated by Defronzo the leaders of the conservative groups may be the key to a potential conservative revolution in Bolivia. One of Defronzo’s critical pieces of a revolutionary movement is the elite population defecting against the government in power. “Divisions among elites (groups that have access to wealth and power of various types or are highly educated) pit some elite members against the existing government.” (Defranzo, 1991, pg.12). Camacho is among one of the elites to turn against the status quo of the MAS party having power in Bolivia and has led opposition groups against this status quo.
Camacho has already gained significant political support and holds a place in the elite population. “Luis Fernando Camacho is a lawyer and former President of the “Comite Pro Santa Cruz,” an organization of businesses, unions, and neighborhood associations based in Santa Cruz” (Blansett, 2020). Before Camacho began gaining political momentum, he was a lawyer and a powerful stakeholder in the Santa Cruz community. This powerful position served him well and he was able to gain support from people in Santa Cruz in order to oppose the MAS party. “Santa Cruz is the country’s wealthiest region and a bastion of opposition to Morales and his Movement for Socialism (MAS). MAS’s support base lies in the west of Bolivia, which is home to most of the country’s Indigenous population.” (Nugent, 2020). These two regions are close geographically, but politically are worlds apart, and Camacho has been able to capitalize on that divide.
In this scenario the elites in Santa Cruz already oppose the MAS party and are following the lead of Camacho and his right-wing party. Camacho’s stance and politics lean far-right and is often compared to other right-leaning leaders in Latin America. “Some Latin American media outlets dub Camacho ‘the Bolivian Bolsonaro’, in reference to Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, a far-right provocateur” (Nugent, 2020). Camacho was able to inspire the wealthy and powerful in Santa Cruz to essentially oppose the MAS party and everything they stand for. Will this opposition in Santa Cruz grow to a full-blown conservative revolution in Bolivia? Will these right-wing groups one day change the current status quo of Bolivia and possibly be a movement toward a conservative Bolivia?
Conclusion
The Bolivian revolution of the 2000s traces its roots back to the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement party of the 1940s. The MNR introduced accessible democracy and nationalized resources for Indigenous peoples of Bolivia. Fast forward to the 1980s and the external pressure of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank resulted in neoliberal policies manifesting in Bolivian politics. These neoliberal policies threatened the nationalized resources of the country, cherished by Indigenous peoples. The election of Gonzalo “Goni” Sanchez de Lozado in 1993 finally saw neoliberal policies implemented in Bolivia and the privatization of many public resources from water and oil to the country’s national airlines. These privatizations saw little benefit and instead served to the detriment of the citizens of Bolivia, such as water prices doubling.
The resulting privatizations set the stage for a revolutionary situation in Bolivia. The privatizations sparked a series of protests from 2000 to 2005 backed by the Indigenous peoples of Bolivia, dubbed water and gas wars. And ultimately resulted in the resignation of two presidents, Goni de Lozado and Carlos Mesa, before revolutionary leader, Evo Morales, took office backed by the MAS party. The new government implemented a new constitution and cemented the revolution as a success in their favor.
Two revolutionary theories can be aptly and successfully applied to the Bolivian revolution. First, James Defronzo’s theory and its five stages successfully outlines how Bolivia’s revolutionary situation progressed. From the first stage, society’s intellectuals turned against the regime in power. Marked by the formation of the MAS party in 1998 to combat Bolivia’s neoliberal government. To his fifth and final stage whereby the moderate government fails, and radicals take power. Marked by the MAS’ Evo Morales being elected president.
The second theorist, Che Guevara with his Guerilla Foco theory and its three critical aspects were successfully realized in Bolivia. The corruption of capitalism occurred due to the implementation of neoliberal policies which failed. Indigenous people successfully utilized both partisan warfare and psychological warfare. With a clearly partisan target, Bolivia’s neoliberal policies and the actors who perpetuated said policies. And the psychological warfare waged via the mass social unrest organized into general strikes and road blockades widely visible across the country. Finally, the urban setting proved to be the favorable ground of the revolution, providing the people with a means to implement their psychological warfare.
However, current events in Bolivia indicate that the revolutionary outcome cemented through a new constitution in 2009, might not be the end of the revolution. Since 2009, Evo Morales successfully abolished term limits for public office. And in 2019 he fled the country amidst protests sparked over a potentially illegitimate election that would have resulted in Morales’ fourth term as president. In his place the government of Bolivia instituted a conservative interim president, Jeanine Avrez, reminiscent of the previously ineffective conservative neoliberal presidents. Despite the MAS party eventually regaining control of the government through the election of Luis Arce, the party’s public image has been damaged by Morales. And a conservative movement is now thriving in Bolivia, led by Luis Fernando Camacho, and is seeking power.
Works Cited
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Blansett, Kaitlyn. “A Conversation with Luis Fernando Camacho.” The Dialogue, January 13, 2020. https://www.thedialogue.org/analysis/a-conversation-with-luis-fernando-camacho/.
“Conservatives in Bolivia Protest against the Inauguration of President Elect Arce.” MercoPress, 2020. https://en.mercopress.com/2020/11/06/conservatives-in-bolivia-protest-against-the-inaugurationof-president-elect-arce.
Defronzo, James (1991). Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements. Westview Press, 9-30.
Guevara, C. (1960). General Principles of Guerilla Warfare. In Guerilla Warfare, (pp. 47-77).
Guevara, C. (2005). Socialism and Man in Cuba. In Che Reader. Ocean Press.
Goldstone, Jack A. The Encyclopedia of Political Revolutions, Taylor & Francis Group, 1999. ProQuest Ebook Central, https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucb/detail.action?docID=2037849.
Nugent, Ciara. “How Luis Fernando Camacho Brought Down Bolivia’s Evo Morales.” Time. Time, November 15, 2019. https://time.com/5728279/luis-fernando-camacho-bolivia/.
Miller, Michael. “The Rise of Evo Morales”. Modern Latina America. Brown University Library. https://library.brown.edu/create/modernlatinamerica/chapters/chapter-6-the-andes/moments-in-a ndean-history/the-rise-of-evo-morales/
Phillips, Tom. “Evo Morales to Return from Exile to Bolivia in 800-Vehicle Convoy.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, November 5, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/05/bolivias-exiled-former-president-evo-moralesreturn.
Phillips, Tom. “Bolivia’s New Leftwing President: ‘We Have Reclaimed Democracy’.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, November 8, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/08/luis-arce-bolivia-president-elect-left-morales.
Schultz, J. (2003). Bolivia: The Water War Widens. NACLA Report on the Americas, 34-37.
Shoaei, M. (n.d.). MAS and the Indigenous People of Bolivia. University of South Florida Scholar Commons.
Trigo, María Silvia, Anatoly Kurmanaev, and Allison Mccann. “As Politicians Clashed, Bolivia’s Pandemic Death Rate Soared.” The New York Times. The New York Times, August 22, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/22/world/americas/virus-bolivia.html.
Wood, Bryan (2019). Could Bolivia’s Current Politics be Fueling Indigenous Discrimination? PBS, Photo by REUTERS/Marco Bello. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/could-bolivias-current-politics-be-fueling-indigenous-discrimination
Webber, J. R. (2005). Left-Indigenous Struggles in Bolivia: Searching for Revolutionary Democracy. Monthly Review.
Image Attribution
Evo Morales 2 year Bolivia by Joel Alvarez is licensed under CC BY 3.0.