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Ali Khamenei speech during Iranian revolution – Imam Reza hospital , Mashhad photo posted by Khamenei.ir is in the public domain
“We are the generation of Social Media; our biggest Revolution is a Tweet of 141 Characters.”
– Sandra Chami Kassis (Twitter, 2013)
In order to understand the theories of revolution outlined in this book, several cases of revolution around the world need to be looked at. This chapter will focus specifically on the revolution that Iran endured in 1979 and then the Green Revolution that later occurred in 2009. Before providing an analysis of the Iranian Revolution through the lens of Brinton’s stages of revolution and Skocpol’s theory of revolution, it is important to understand a brief background of Iran leading up to the country’s revolutionary situation.
The religious composition of Iran plays a major role in the analysis of the Iranian revolution, and by the 1700s, 89% of Iranians identified as Shia Muslims (DeFronzo, 1991). Fast forward to the 1900s, during this time the Qajar Dynasty ruled over the Iranian region (DeFronzo, 1991). Under this dynasty, Iran had strong international relationships with Russia and Britain (DeFronzo, 1991). Often Iran would provide economic favors to these countries and as World War I occurred, these relationships only strengthened due to advancements in technology and the switch from coal to oil. The Iranian people already disliked that their government seemed to cater to the Russians as well as the British. Then, in 1921, those feelings intensified even more when the Qajar Dynasty was overthrown. At this point in history, Russia and Britain were not on the best of terms, so the British intervened in Iran to help replace the Qajar Dynasty with a regime that would be better suited to British interests, thus starting the Pahlavi dynasty in 1926 (DeFronzo, 1991).
With the change to the Pahlavi dynasty, Iran immediately started trying to modernize their country (DeFronzo, 1991). The Pahlavi Dynasty aimed to expedite the growth of their new middle class. However, in the process of all of this modernization, the Pahlavi Dynasty started restricting the power of the clergy (DeFronzo, 1991). As the Pahlavi Dynasty worked to achieve reforms, some believed that the Shia influence within Iran would only slow progress towards social change. The Iranian people did not agree with these actions. Rather than modernizing, Iranians viewed this more as westernizing. However, The Pahlavi dynasty, particularly Mohammad Reza Shah, strategically implemented his policies. The Shah countered new policies with actions to appease the Iranian people even though he had a liberal agenda (DeFronzo, 1991). For example, he renegotiated the oil agreement between Iranians and the British. The new agreement awarded Iran with more favorable terms (DeFronzo, 1991). Through this action, the Shah aimed to be viewed as a strong, independent leader rather than a puppet to the west.
Despite the Shah’s best efforts at appeasing his people while also modernizing Iran, the Iran he created had one fatal flaw. Two distinct cultures existed within Iran, each with far different values. One culture within the Iranian people consisted of a new middle class that conformed to western ideals and did not adhere strictly to religious values and traditions. The other culture within the Iranian people stringently followed the ulama and their religious guidance no matter how much the Shah tried to separate religion from his policies. The individuals adhering to this culture saw the Shah’s decisions as a complete disregard for the tradition of the Islamic religion. Between these two cultures, discontent among the Iranian people only grew stronger which set the stage for the revolutions in this chapter.
In addition to the distinct cultures, the Iranian people also faced worsening living conditions as well as a lack of ways to participate in the political process. All of these things together contributed to the mass frustration that fostered the revolution. The Iranian people were already frustrated with their government for the reasons mentioned above, so when Ayatollah Kohmeini, the main figure head of the opposition during the Iranian Revolution, started speaking out against the Shah regime, the alternative path for the future of Iran he offered was at least considered rather than shunned right away.
Brinton As It Applies to the 1979 Revolution
Revolutions are not caused simply by unrest and disagreement within a country. Often countries can face revolutionary situations but never truly face any revolutionary outcomes. Instead, revolutions are a process that comes from change and various influential factors.
Crane Brinton’s Anatomy of a Revolution presents an understanding of this process. Brinton established the consistencies and stages that are applicable to revolutions overall. All of Brinton’s stages, including Meisel’s addition, are crucial to explore when studying Iran: moderates coming to power, radicals coming to power, the crisis period, thermidor, and the subversion of the revolution to the right wing. This section of the chapter will explore how the Iranian revolution of the late 1970s falls almost directly into line with Brinton’s Anatomy of a Revolution. Applying Brinton’s understanding of revolutions to Iran can help to identify and analyze the factors that can drive revolutionary situations and outcomes.
Brinton established his ideas on revolution from English, French, Russian, and American, revolutions in 1938. However, the process and characteristics of revolution that he presented reflect the events experienced in Iran with surprising accuracy. The Iranian revolution in 1979 ended the reign of the Shah and resulted in the emergence of the Islamic Republic. Before the revolution, Iran experienced prominent changes regarding the economy and democracy, the country came closer and closer to facing a revolution. The head of Iran, Mohammad Reza Shah implemented many changes within the country that led to damaging effects on citizens. The consequences of the changes implemented were never addressed by Reza Shah, causing Iranians contempt for their government to grow significantly, ultimately leading to the Iranian Revolution (DeFronzo, 1991).
Crane Brinton’s Anatomy of a Revolution outlines the process by which revolutions occur. He explains the timeline of revolution in terms of power shifts between opposing groups eventually leading to a violent crisis and a resurgence in support for moderate political governance to restore peace. Brinton claims that in the first stage of revolution moderate reformers gain political power. The decision to label the first stage of revolution as the first change in political power is interesting because, especially in the case of Iran, it implies that the unrest and organization before the formal transfer of power is not part of the revolution but pre-revolution. Using Brinton’s stages, the 1979 Iranian revolution began after the Shah traveled to the US to receive lung cancer treatment (Milani, 2012). Immediately following his departure his political rival Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran from his exile in France and founded the Islamic Revolutionary Council (Abrahamian, 1982; Abrahamian, 2008). Khomeini’s transitional government was supported by an anti-Shah coalition which included Marxists as well as religious hardliners, effectively creating a politically moderate government that came together to craft a new constitution and remove the Shah (DeFronzo, 1991).
The moderate coalition began to fray in 1980 when the Shah died, Iran held free elections, and Iraq invaded. The two main political groups, the Islamic Revolutionary Party (IRP) and the Mujahideen, had completely different goals and ideas about post-revolution governance. While Khomeini retained power, Bani Sadr, a candidate supported by the Mujahideen, became the first president of Iran. In 1981, Khomeini removed Bani-Sadr from office and consolidated power for himself and religious conservatives (DeFronzo, 1991).
Brinton posits that after moderates have lost power over a country, radicals take advantage of the weakened government and rise to power themselves. This is the second stage of a revolution. When radicals enter into power, the revolution reaches a stage that consists of radical ideologies and reforms. Ayatollah Khomeini’s political ascension marks Iran’s entrance into this stage. With the Shah’s death, Khomeini took full advantage of the weak government that was in place. After removing Bani-Sadr from power, Khomeini called on his supporters to confront the Iranian military in order to gain full power. Eventually, members of the military either aligned with Khomeini or chose to safely remain impartial (DeFronzo, 1991). In 1979, Khomeini put into place a new constitution that officially named him as the rahbar (Iranian Constitution), or political leader of Iran (DeFronzo, 1991). This stage of the Iranian revolution demonstrated how powerful radicals take advantage of weak, moderate governments in order to push a radical agenda forward.
Although the public supported Khomeini, his reign was no more peaceful than the Shah’s, and there was popular opposition to the political party he led: the Islamic Revolutionary Party. Following the election of the opposition party candidate, the Mujahideen supported Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, Khomeini began to crack down more forcefully on political opposition. While Khomeini maintained power, he continuously violated human rights and pushed Iran into a crisis period (DeFronzo, 1991). Khomeini’s abuse of power and violent repression marks the third stage of the revolution as the country experienced a reign of terror. Brinton established that during this stage, radical leaders attempt to solidify the power that has been gained. When the newly established radical government works to centralize power, leaders often resort to using state power against anyone who opposes it, even its own citizens. Although Khomeini denounced the corruption of the Shah, it was under his power that human rights were constantly abused. Thousands of citizens were imprisoned for having supported the previous government (Brannigan, 1979). Countless political prisoners were then executed for their connection to the Shah. To note, the number of prisoners executed has never been disclosed to the citizens of Iran (Human Rights Watch, 2019).
The political divide and the internal state in Iran worsened in 1980 when Iraq invaded the country and began supporting the Mujahideen in opposition to Khomeini. This provocation by Iraq lengthened the crisis period within Iran and the conflict lasted eight years, leading to the continued terror against the Iranian people from both sides. The opposition organized bombings across the country and killed many high-ranking political officials. The revolutionary guard put in place by Khomeini’s regime committed executions and other human rights abuses in order to repress political opposition. When the two sides finally agreed to a cease-fire in 1988, the internal political polarization between the religious conservatives (IRC) and the secular liberals (Mujahideen) remained, but the appetite for violence did not (DeFronzo, 1991).
Before Khomeini’s death in 1989, he named Ayatollah Ali Khameini to succeed him as rahbar (DeFronzo, 1991). For Iran, Khameini represents the Thermidor and the return to political moderates in power. The first president elected after the war, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was an immensely popular and well-known Iranian congressman who created a coalition which included many factions and touted a pragmatic approach to rebuilding the Iranian economy (Parsi, 2007). Due to its diversity, the government under Rafsani remained moderate even as radical groups on either side became agitated. While this government was effective in helping Iran to rebuild from the near decade of violence and repression, it remained relatively weak. However, in 1997, when the liberal president Mohamoud Katami was elected, the conservative religious faction leaned into the power of Khameini to thwart Katami’s attempt to liberalize politics and the media (DeFronzo, 1991). The religious elite orchestrated the arrest, execution, or disqualification of reformist politicians in the 2005 elections and a conservative president was elected. The election of Mohamoud Ahmadinejad indicated the subversion of weak government by the conservative ruling class. Although Miesel’s addendum to Brinton’s stages specifies subversion by an authoritarian figure (i.e., Hitler), the 2005 election solidified the power grab by the conservative religious oligarchy in Iran. Despite being created forty years prior, Crane Brinton’s stages of revolution describe the political tumult between moderates and radicals of the 1979 Iranian revolution very accurately.
Skocpol & The Green Revolution
Although the Iranian revolution proved successful and Iran was voted by the people to be an Islamic Republic, Iran had not yet faced all of its opposition. On June 13th, 2009 then-incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad claimed victory over his opponent Mir Hussein Mousavi in the 2009 presidential election (Dagres, 2012). However, the people of Iran believed the election had been far from a fair and free election. Outraged by the election results, Iranians took to the streets to protest the election in response to their new President, (Rouzbeh, 2013). Iran faced the largest demonstration in their country since the overthrow of the Shah regime in 1979. The Iranian government suppressed as many of the protests as possible in response to the public outcry, killing more than 30 Iranians in the process (Dagres, 2012). This course of events is what led to what the world understands as the green wave which, in this chapter, will be analyzed through Theda Skocpol’s theory of revolution.
To summarize Skocpol’s theory from earlier in this book, Skocpol explains the differences between social revolutions and political rebellions, specifically that social revolutions tend to have national and international effects (Skocpol, 1994). In addition, revolutions are influenced by structural forces. These structural forces can lead to social revolutions that tend to originate from class-based discontent and the revolutionary outcomes from these uprisings will determine how the regime in charge at the end of a revolution will organize itself (Skocpol, 1994).
Leading up to the Green Revolution, Iran’s middle class was growing which resulted in many young, educated individuals that felt as if their country lacked opportunity (Rouzbeh, 2013). This small part of the Iranian population made demands that seemed to align with Western ideals, which through the lens of Skocpol could be considered a change in the social structure of Iran. For example, a few of the demands included an increase in the shrinking economic opportunities, fair political participation, as well as having the freedom of having a dissenting opinion. As a contender for the presidency in Iran, Mir Hossein Mousavi ran for office on a promise to make these reforms and increase civil liberties for young Iranians. The Islamic Republic did not allow for these types of freedoms, and Skocpol’s theory of revolution would see this as the inability of the Iranian government to meet the needs of the people. This treatment of the Iranian citizens was quickly displayed on a global platform for the world to see via social media (Rouzbeh, 2013). The green wave turned into what some call a twitter revolution. Unlike anything the world had seen before, many young Iranians encouraged student reform movements by taking to social media platforms, such as Twitter, to show the world via pictures and videos, demonstrations in real time. Skocpol predicts that patterns of class dominance determine which class will rise up to call for change. In the case of Iran, young Iranians, such as students, became the class of individuals calling for that change. Demonstrations and testimonies of the events happening in Iran led to the repressive aspects of Iranian life being put in the spotlight.
Skocpol theorizes that revolutions can transform state organizations, class structures, and dominant ideologies (Skocpol, 1994). However, one of the leading questions when looking at the green wave or the green revolution is this: Was this a revolution at all? In the eyes of Theda Skocpol, this would be considered a social revolution and Skocpol believes that social revolutions should be analyzed from a structural perspective. Using Skocpol’s structural theory, analyzing international contexts and developments at home and abroad affect the breakdown of the state organizations and old regimes and the buildup of new revolutionary state organizations (Skocpol, 1994). In the case of the Iranian Revolution and the Green Revolution, the system implemented in Iran by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini granted absolute and executive power to whoever the supreme leader was (Dagres, 2012). Thirty years after this system was established, the Islamic republic had a boom in youth that demanded certain rights, such as education. Skocpol’s theory of revolution outlines that basic changes in social structure and political structure occur in unison which occurred during the Green Revolution in Iran (Skocpol, 1994).
Additionally, technology had advanced tremendously between 1979 and 2009. New technologies allowed for instantaneous communication, and protesters connected with people all over the world and within their own country. Advancements in technology and social media allowed for protesters to spread the word of their movement and mobilize faster. In addition, the spread of technology connected Iranians to expatriates all over the world that fled their own countries (Rouzbeh, 2013). More specifically, “The Student Reform Movements and 2nd of Khordad Front are also products of this period and were equally a result of Iranian society’s exposure to neoliberal globalization (Rouzbeh, 2013).” Technology played a major role in decentralizing the revolution which in turn allowed Iranians to connect and mobilize in more discreet, undetectable ways. Since 1999, many protests and movements took place that eventually helped pave the way for Iranians to break the historical silence during the Green Revolution. Globalization did not stop there, it spread new ideas to all spheres of life and Skocpol’s prediction that a social revolution would have national and international impacts rang true for Iran. The Green Revolution paved the way for the use of technology and social media platforms in future revolutions, such as the Arab Spring.
Following Skocpol’s structuralist approach, changes in social systems give way to new class interests (Skocpol, 1994). For the case of Iran, people started to consider religious life to be private and should remain personal and outside of the government (Rouzbeh 2013). Furthermore, changes in the way Iranians protested shows the influence of neo-liberalization in Iran (Rouzbeh 2013). Rather than using walls to demonstrate, Iranians took to social media (Rouzbeh 2013). The young, educated Iranians calling for more economic and political opportunity demonstrates the new class interests Skocpol theorizes about. Skocpol also theorizes that rebellious masses will act on their own without influence from external forces (Skocpol, 1994). The revolutionary situation occurred in Iran because of the crisis of the state which created a challenge the state could not meet. The government was not adapting its policies to the growing needs of the people of Iran, ultimately leading to the protests and demonstrations in 2009. Between the dire economic situation and high inflation rates in Iran, as well as the government’s inability to address the social needs of its people, the government created an environment where the social and political structure of Iran was strained. By boldly suppressing these protests claiming election fraud, the Iranian government widened the gap between the government and the people, thus blocking any way for the people to express their grievances in the political structure of their own country.
Skocpol believes that another factor in creating a revolutionary situation is that patterns of class dominance determine which group will rise (Skocpol, 1994). However, when looking at the Green Revolution, a regime change did not occur after the green wave of protests. Although many Iranians saw the election as fraudulent, it is also important to note that protesters were not calling for a regime change in the first place. They simply wanted their voices heard and allowed involvement in the political process (Dagres, 2012). Although Skocpol theorizes that social revolutions change both state institutions and social structures of society, the institutions of Iran did not change when the protests emerged (Skocpol, 1994). In some ways, this was not a successful social revolution because the protests and demand for civil liberties were repressed by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the previous revolution did not resolve the class relations in Iran. After the protests, the outdated monarchists and the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), which had lost credibility, tried joining in the movement. It was too late for the elite and the people felt as if they could not relate to the revolution (Dabashi, 2013). Many expatriate Iranians from all over the world still encouraged democracy.
Ultimately, Skocpol notes that a revolution will happen when the individuals in a society do not share the same values as the institutions of their society (Skocpol, 1994). For the case of Iran, the Green Revolution was an instance where the members of society had differing values from their government that they wanted their institutions to recognize. However, the members of society also still shared many other values with their government, such as the importance of the Islamic religion (Rouzbeh, 2013). So, in June 2009, a full-fledged revolution with a regime change was simply not going to happen. In addition, when it comes to Iran, Skocpol predicted correctly that a social revolution would have both national and international impact. The world had never experienced a revolution that relied so heavily on social media. Through their use of social media platforms, protesters were able to gain international attention to their support that not only put the events unfolding in Iran on the international radar much more quickly that they would have in the past, but this also allowed the entire world to make their judgements about Iranian life from a much more personal perspective.
The Green Revolution was unique for its time. The revolution happened quickly and was quashed by the governing regime swiftly. Although the Green Revolution did not dismantle the regime that the revolution was fighting against, it encouraged people to start speaking out against their government to share with the world what life in Iran was genuinely like (Dagres, 2012). Ultimately, the future of Iran is uncertain, and it is unknown where and when things in Iran will change. The region could be altered by regional geopolitics which could change the state of affairs in Iran (Dabashi, 2013). Social media allowed for Iranians to connect with others and understand that their frustrations were not singular. For now, though, the Iranian people are biding their time to see what their future holds.
Final Thoughts
Overall, the Iranian Revolution proves to be a useful case when trying to understand Brinton’s stages of revolution. In addition, the Green Revolution shows that Skocpol’s theory of social revolutions are more relevant than ever as technology continuously advances, and countries develop. Iran has an immense respect for religion in their society, but many Iranians also want more liberal rights. This clash of cultures plagues the Iranian government and this question still remains today: Can an Islamic theocracy still provide civil liberties to its citizens without sacrificing its religious beliefs or being seen as too pro-Western? As long as this question exists without any resolution, Iran may very well experience more social revolutions in the future.
Works Cited
Abrahamian, Ervand. A History of Modern Iran. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Abrahamian, Ervand. Iran between Two Revolutions. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1982.
Rouzbeh, Anahita. “Remembering the Green Revolution,” March 13, 2013.
Skocpol, Theda. “Explaining Social Revolutions: Alternatives to Existing Theories.” Essay. In Social Revolutions in the Modern World, 3–43. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
