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“War is nothing but a continuation of politics with the admixture of other means.”
― Carl von Clausewitz, On War
The ideas that inspired insurgency and counterinsurgency theory have accompanied revolution since the beginning of time. Only in the past two hundred years have theorists begun to formalize and consolidate these ideas, a process primarily inspired by an increase in the popularity of nationalist sentiment around the world and a relative decline of imperial powers that caused a significant mutation in conventional warfare. By first understanding the nature of insurgency and the cultural context of the country under analysis, counterinsurgency theorists can attempt to predict the specific tactics necessary to successfully dissipate revolutionary atmospheres. Throughout history, there have been notable outliers that have subverted expectations of revolutionary potential, grand incompetencies on the part of governments have paved the way for an understanding of the people as a homogenous actor that must be appeased or dismembered. This chapter will analyze both the Algerian conflict and the Surge in Iraq as instances in which counterinsurgency has been successfully implemented and those that have not. We will look at previously discussed theorists to synthesize the characteristics that made or broke these revolutionary situations.
Theoretical And Ideological Basis Of Counterinsurgency Theory
To discover the beginnings of the theory that would shape revolt and response in countless situations throughout the late 19th and entire 20th century, military general Carl von Clausewitz provides an essential basis. This military leader and theorist chronicled his experiences fighting Napoleon and recognized the unprecedented nature of the warfare style he utilized. Through his Napoleonic Wars experiences, Clausewitz made one fundamental discovery – the citizenry’s incredible importance as a wartime commodity. Mobilizing the people in support of the war effort allowed the opposing groups to create a rich source of hatred that would fuel the army to make a continual commitment to the fight. This new relationship between the general population, the armed forces, and the government established the idea of a “wonderful trinity,” where each group has a role to play in providing essential functions like hatred and animosity, probability, and chance, and becoming a subordinate institution in the scheme of warfare (Clausewitz 2006).
However, it became clear that this raw resource of the people’s anger could be harnessed by insurgent groups as well. With this new understanding of warfare came theories for how best to utilize or divert this anger, with Clausewitz positing that governments needed to be systematic and timely about how they dismantled revolutionary social activity in the same spaces that they sprung up, and another theorist, Antoine-Henri Jomini, suggesting that only complete military annihilation of the insurgent forces could quell the insurgency.
Either way, most theorists agree that the increased instance of unconventional warfare requires flexibility and innovation on the part of governments. The United States Government described this well in their Counterinsurgency Guide, saying:
Irregular warfare is far more varied than conventional conflict: hence the importance of an intellectual framework that is coherent enough to provide guidance, and flexible enough to adapt to circumstances. Counterinsurgency places great demands on the ability of bureaucracies to work together, with allies, and increasingly, with nongovernmental organizations.
Counterinsurgency Guide, 2009
As the two theories diverged, they developed into new, broad categories, upon which military figures have based action and demonstration in conflicts like the Algerian conflict, the Vietnam War, the conflict in Malay, and many others. These categories are known as Direct Counterinsurgency and Indirect Counterinsurgency – the former being based on Jominian ideology and the latter upon Clausewitz’s theories. These theories would continue to be shaped by theorists such as Mao Tse-tung and Robert Thompson, who emphasized each method’s strengths and weaknesses through an analysis of uprisings and revolutionary situations.
Development Of Counterinsurgency Theory
To begin, the discussion of insurgent scenarios provides an essential context in understanding why indirect and direct counterinsurgency has been implemented in various revolutionary situations throughout history and how each method’s strengths and weaknesses have been developed and reinforced.
Indirect Counterinsurgency:
Although it began rooted in military strategy, indirect counterinsurgency in its modern form focuses on social strategy – winning over the people’s hearts and minds. Of course, the advantages and disadvantages of each method affect conflict differently. For example, turning the people’s loyalty allows for a citizenry that supports the government during and after the dismantling of the insurgency. Proponents of indirect counterinsurgency mention how governments run the risk of alienating the population when they take overt military action against small groups of insurgents, as this extreme action can appear predatory or out-of-touch (Nagl 2009). Detractors of indirect counterinsurgency describe the difficulties of identifying cells in the local populations as they arise, as having a stable and robust bureaucracy often makes mobilization and communication more difficult. In the time that it takes to identify the cell and the leader, the government runs the risk of experiencing military defeat, further promoting the administration’s supposed incompetency.
Mao Tse-tung of China significantly influenced the standardization and understanding of indirect counterinsurgency. Mao very profoundly understood the value of the people’s loyalty. In turn, he mobilized the mostly uneducated and politically disinclined Chinese peasantry – a unique event in the history of insurgency, as most revolutionary situations develop from the industrial and urban population’s mobilization. In his book, Strategic Problems of China’s Revolutionary War, Mao details exact characteristics of leadership and insurgent forces that instill confidence in the movement among the people, going so far as to create a code of conduct for military individuals when they engaged with the citizenry (Mao, 1968). By emphasizing the social aspects of revolution, currency was given to indirect counterinsurgency ideas – to witness a potent insurgency built upon these foundations emphasized the need for the government to apply similar methods. The people’s importance as a fuel for the insurgents is best exemplified by Mao’s famous metaphor where the insurgents are the fish, and the people are the water in which the fish swims. To successfully counter an insurgency is to remove the fish from the water.
Along these lines, Robert Thompson created his Five Principles of Counterinsurgency, which describe the commitments that the government should make to the people to maintain or secure their loyalty and reinforce the imperative of building rapport over establishing military superiority (Thompson, 2005).
Five Principles of Counterinsurgency:
- “The government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable,”
- “The government must function in accordance with law.”
- “The government must have an overall plan.”
- “The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas.”
- “In the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first.”
Direct Counterinsurgency:
Perhaps the more traditional approach to insurgency are the ideas of direct counterinsurgency. This theory is wholly based on the idea that military might is paramount and that, at the core, as American Army Colonel Harry Summers put it, “war is war is war.” Proponents of direct counterinsurgency claim that the only way to ensure one has snuffed the flame of revolution is to exhibit military prowess overwhelmingly. Detractors of direct counterinsurgency recognize that warfare trends have mutated over time and that this more conventional approach may be ineffective against guerrilla tactics. As described by William Rufus, when this complete annihilation tactic is repurposed for guerilla warfare, it is acceptable to take direct counterinsurgency down to the destruction of citizens and even domestic animals. However, it may result in a humanitarian crisis, pulling global watch dogs’ attention to the situation and further compromising conditions that would drive a successful counterinsurgency, like a supportive global context (Nagl, 2009).
Hybrid Counterinsurgency:
Although most theorists argue that indirect insurgency has a higher degree of efficacy, in some contexts, just as DeFronzo details in his categorization of movements as a mixture of conservative and liberal motivations, a mixture of indirect and direct counterinsurgency may end up being the correct strategy to quell an insurgency effectively. We see evidence of this combination strategy in the Malayan Emergency, primarily discussed in the next chapter.
The Algerian Conflict
Introduction:
The pressures placed upon states in Africa when imperialism began to collapse in the mid-20th century created an environment of increased corruption within the imperial governments. These pressures translated down to the people who experienced increased marginalization and ethnicity-based crime and discrimination. French Algeria serves as a poignant example of these changes in the administration of government and services. This country was nominally content during the first century of its imperial rule. The discontent that these modifications sowed led to the Algerian Revolt (1956 – 1962) and a desperate attempt on the French government to regain control and the respect of the people.
The Progression From Discontent To Spark:
During the 1920s and 1930s, the French started treating Algerians poorly by taking back land owned by Algerians, refusing to grant Algerians French citizenship, and favoring Europeans in elections – actions that caused Algerians to become angry and begin organizing protests. In 1936, the French attempted to appease the Algerians by implementing the Violette Plan, which extended French citizenship to Muslim “elites” like university graduates, elected officials, professionals, and army officers (American University 1985). The évolués, a group of Algerians educated under European academic institutions and a group that directly benefited from this plan, declared this a significant progress.
The conditions inspired by the Violette Plan continued tenuously until May of 1945 when a celebration held for the French liberation from the Nazis in the Algerian city of Sétif transformed into a march for Algerian liberation. Despite attempts by the police to de-escalate the situation, massive riots ensued. In the five days following this event, Algerians indiscriminately targeted Europeans living in Sétif and wreaked havoc upon the city until French police finally regained control. In retaliation, the French police arrested mass groups of Muslims, even going so far as to carry out public executions. The crisis in Sétif became a significant turning point in public regard for the French government and is now recognized as one of the critical events in the path to war.
On All Saints Day 1954, tensions boiled over. The National Liberation Front (FLN) launched attacks against military institutions, police posts, and other public utilities, effectively beginning the revolution. These violent attacks continued incessantly for the remaining months of 1954 and set the tone for the rest of the revolution. In August of 1955, the Pieds Noirs’ massacre reinforced the hostile nature of the conflict and further established a foundation for the revolutionary situations that developed between 1956 and 1962.
French Response:
The FLN continued to utilize non-traditional tactics throughout the conflict, employing maquisards (guerrillas) to strike military and civilian targets (American University 1985). This radical activity startled the French government, who stumbled into creating a counterattack plan for the conflict’s opening months. However, the French ultimately came up with several counterinsurgency tactics, the most famous and successful of which were quadrillage, dividing the country into a grid and surveilling those grids individually, and ratissage, raids instituted by the police (Lilley 2012). The French created camps designed to separate innocent civilians from insurgents, hoping to distinguish between those involved and those not easier and prevent unnecessary torture and death. However, the French’s counterinsurgency tactics’ direct nature only increased anti-French sentiment among Algerians and emboldened the FLN. The group continued to carry-out guerilla warfare, like grenade attacks on cafes and door-to-door attacks on entire families (Lilley 2012).
Following these attacks, the French instituted a policy of killing 10 Algerians for every Frenchman killed, resulting in 1,273 insurgent deaths (Lilley 2012). After this retaliation, civilians were much more likely to voice support for the insurgents, making the already blurry line of insurgents vs. non-insurgents that much more difficult to distinguish, reinforcing the idea espoused by Clausewitz and developed by Mao that the people are just as avid participants in the war effort as the formal armies and government.
The events between 1956 and 1962 done by those fighting for Algerian independence and the resulting reactions from the French oppositional forces offer clear examples of direct and indirect counterinsurgency. Varying degrees of counterinsurgency effectiveness occurred for both sides of the conflict. By using tactics that the French had never witnessed in war before, the Algerians proved themselves to be dedicated to their cause and willing to go about obtaining their desired revolutionary outcomes by whatever means necessary. Additionally, by using these unconventional tactics, the French were at a disadvantage, and by using such extreme counterinsurgency efforts to stop the Algerian forces, they ultimately hurt their chances of winning the conflict. The Algerian Revolution serves as a prime example of guerilla warfare’s effectiveness and the consequences of various counterinsurgency methods. Overall, it can be argued that the French generally used more of a “direct coin” approach when it came to trying to fight off the Algerian insurgents. Rather than trying to gain the people’s trust and win the conflict more peacefully, the French executed many potential threats instead of taking the time to distinguish between insurgents and non-insurgents, thus demonstrating a clear case of direct counterinsurgency. While the French may have used other counterinsurgency methods, including indirect coin cases, the majority of their attacks fall under the category of direct counterinsurgency.
Additionally, the five principles of counterinsurgency aid in illustrating why the French were so unsuccessful in Algeria. For example, the fourth principle states that “the government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerillas,” and in the case of the French, they targeted the guerillas solely in such a divisive manner and failed to address the political subversion at all (Thompson 2005). In a slightly less extreme controversy, the French failed to adhere to the fifth principle, which states that “in the guerilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first” (Thompson 2005). Rather than securing their bases first, the French acted erratically and tried to destroy any hint of guerilla action, making this another major factor in their failure in Algeria. Overall, when looking to explain the causes of the French failure in Algeria, counterinsurgency theory offers necessary insight and information.
The Iraqi Conflict
Introduction:
The increase in globalization and global Superpowers’ involvement in other countries’ political affairs over the past century has created unique conditions for the development of insurgency and counterinsurgency. The Surge in Iraq exemplifies indirect counterinsurgency that evolved from this context. Unlike the insurgency in Algeria, which developed due to popular discontent with the colonial government, the insurgency in Iraq resulted because of conditions that stemmed from international war between the United States and Iraq. This initial conflict resulted in Saddam Hussein’s overthrow and his government by the US, which enraged the citizenry and led them to organize.
A Unique Context:
The Iraq War began in 2003 with the US invasion titled ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ (“Timeline: Iraq War” 2016). Despite efforts on the part of the US to gain international support and the eventual naming of 30 members to the ‘Coalition of the Willing,’ many more countries did not approve of this war. No Arab countries announced support for the United States in this matter, and the invasion caused favorable opinion of the US to decline around the world (Schifferes 2003). The international community’s criticism stemmed from a lack of faith in the United States’ motivations as reasons for the invasion, such as the claim that Saddam Hussein had access to weapons of mass destruction. Whether or not the Bush administration believed in those claims or had evidence to back them up has been questioned intensely over the years because no Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) have ever been found in Iraq, and many analysts of the situation believe there was no intelligence to imply otherwise (“The Iraq War”).
The exact causes of the war cannot be neatly explained in one sentence, and there remains much debate about whether or not the Bush administration had other reasons for going to war. According to historians, those reasons range from appearing strong on the ‘War on Terror’ for political reasons at home, capitalizing on access to oil that region has in excess, or it could have been a result of lousy intelligence that informed the Bush administration’s belief that Saddam Hussein had access to weapons of mass destruction (Kessler 2019). However, it is agreed upon that one of the primary motivations for the invasion was to oust Saddam Hussein’s regime and install a democracy in the region.
Although President George W. Bush declared “mission accomplished” on May 1, 2003, the war in Iraq did not end with the destruction of Saddam Hussein’s regime (“Timeline: Iraq War” 2016). While Hussein was captured on December 13, 2003, the absence of his regime created a power vacuum in the region and ultimately led to a civil war. The United States and other coalition members, therefore, became the responsible actors. The parliamentary elections held in 2005 were thought to be a step toward democracy for the country. The Shia, who made up approximately sixty percent of the population, won the majority, the Kurdish population, who made up twenty percent of the population, came in second, and the Sunnis, who made up fifteen percent of the population, but had held political control until this point, protested the election (“Timeline: Iraqi Elections 2016). This election was not the crucial step toward democracy that the United States was hoping for, as it ended up exacerbating tensions between the Sunni and the Shia. This tension led to the rise of Sunni extremist groups, Shia extremist groups, and Al-Qaeda. While the first few months of the war were an example of traditional warfare between two nation-states, the focus quickly turned to counterinsurgency.
The Dynamic Nature Of Counterinsurgency:
Before 2007, the strategy in Iraq was based on direct counterinsurgency. As a result of this, violence on behalf of Sunni extremists, Shia extremists, and Al Qaeda became more prevalent. Frequently, these insurgent groups would use the violence the US military enacted to create propaganda and recruit more extremists (Baker 2006). In December of 2006, the US government published the Iraq Study Group report (Baker 2006). This report designated Iraq’s situation as “grave and deteriorating” (Baker 2006, 6). It warned that if the United States continued with their current strategy, the Sunni/Shia conflict could spread throughout the region, and there could be a humanitarian crisis (Baker 2006) on a scale similar to those detailed by William Rufus. This report provided context to analyze the failures of direct counterinsurgency as a military strategy and prompted the Bush administration to change course (Abramowitz 2007).
On January 10, 2007, President George W. Bush announced the Surge (Abramowitz 2007). This “Surge” was a plan to increase the number of troops in Iraq to 200,000 (Abramowitz 2007). As a result of this campaign, the United States military’s goal became protecting Iraqi civilians (Schifrin 2018). When pressed to describe the purpose of the campaign, George W. Bush claimed, “daily life will improve, Iraqis will gain confidence in their leaders, and the government will have the breathing space it needs to make progress in other critical areas” (Schifrin 2018). This increased focus on the wellbeing and support of the people is a clear example of indirect counterinsurgency in terms of changing the opinions of the people. The goal of indirect COIN as developed by Mao focuses on “changing hearts and minds” and clearly outlined the Bush administration’s goal. The strategy in Iraq shifted from trying to defeat the insurgents with military power to convince Iraqi civilians that the United States’ way of governing was a better option than the one provided by Islamic extremists. Once those civilians had been convinced, the US could focus on transferring power to the new, more westernized Iraqi government.
While violence increased in the first year of this strategy’s implementation after 2007, Iraq’s violence experienced a sharp decline (Biddle 2012). Critics claim that the Sunni awakening or merely a coincidence resulted in this decline (Biddle 2012). However, this strategy allowed the United States to begin withdrawing troops from Iraq in 2013 under the Obama administration (Fordham). Other criticisms of the surge strategy include arguing that the temporary solution allowed violence to continue after the United States left (Kingsbury 2014). This idea does hold some credibility as violence continues in the region for over a decade since the strategy was revealed (Awadalla 2020). Additionally, American citizens disliked the Surge as it caused increased spending on an already unpopular war (McHugh 2015). This anger back home is a common criticism of indirect counterinsurgency. It costs much more than direct COIN, making it unpopular to the country, which would rather see tax dollars spent on benefits for themselves. Scholars dispute if the Iraq war occurred because the Bush administration wanted to spread democracy throughout the Middle East, capitalize on the oil readily available in the region, or appear tough on terror. However, by the end of the war, the United States military clearly expressed their goal; to install a westernized democratic government through indirect counterinsurgency.
Conclusion
Forged from the battlefields of the Napoleonic Wars, Henri-Antoine Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz’s theories regarding how war should be conducted would influence army tactics more than a century in the future. While Jomini promoted the adoption of total annihilation Clausewitz advertised the key role of the “holy trinity” consisting of governance, people, and the army. Unlike Jomini which called for total war, Clausewitz visualized the importance of stabilizing the politics and people of the occupied in addition to just battling the opponent’s army. These ideas would evolve overtime especially during the post-World War II era as war moved away from battles consisting of established armies to a standard army typically fighting a paramilitary force. Two of conflict examples that consist of these two distinct strategies, now known as direct and indirect counterinsurgency, are the Algerian Revolution and the Surge of Iraq. Both wars see the conventional armies, France, and the United States, use direct and indirect counterinsurgency overtime and reveal the general flaws and benefits that come with their usage. Similarly, the two case studies provide evidence of the advantages that paramilitary forces exploit weaknesses when fighting a uniform force. Further legitimizing these two counterinsurgency theories, future chapters will explore military tactics as a key aspect of a revolution’s success.
Works Cited
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Image Attribution
Vom Kriege by Carl Von Clausewitz by Rabe.dd is in the public domain
Monument of General Jomini in Payerne by Spyridon is licensed CC BY-SA 4.0. Sculpture by Raphaël Lugeon
