“We made the state, and the state made war.”

-Charles Tilly

Charles Tilly, born on May 27th, 1929, in Lombard, Illinois, graduated from Harvard University in 1950, where he earned his doctorate in sociology. He went on to teach at multiple universities in North America, including Columbia University and the University of Delaware. He spent his academic career studying and critiquing theories of revolution and, in the process producing his theory (Martin, 2008). Tilly studied under Barrington Moore as a Ph.D. student. Moore’s teachings heavily influence much of Tilly’s theory. Tilly’s theory also draws from Karl Marx, as it points to society’s structure as an incubator for revolution. Through his structural lens, he asserts that state structures like the economy, politics, and a state’s culture widely affect the circumstance of revolutions (Martin, 2008).

In Tilly’s book, European Revolutions 1492-1992 (1993) his broad conception of revolution argues that:

Great revolutions do not develop sui generis, subject to laws that separate them entirely from more routine forms of political change. Take the difference between solar eclipses and traffic jams. Revolutions do not resemble eclipses of the sun, which because of the regularities of celestial motion repeat on a precise schedule under specifiable and perfectly comprehensible conditions – those conditions and no others. Instead, revolutions resemble traffic jams, which vary greatly in form and severity, merge imperceptibly into routine vehicular flows, develop from those flows, and happen in different circumstances for a number of reasons (Tilly, 1993: p. 7).

His theory does not accommodate for “invariant necessary and sufficient conditions for all times and all places” (Tilly, 1993: p. 8). He does, however, lay out some causal mechanisms that are seen across several revolutions such as “the dramatic demonstration that a previously formidable state is vulnerable and the partial dissolution of existing state powers that commonly occurs in post-war demobilization” (Tilly, 1993: p. 8). In Tilly’s theory he defines two conditions of understanding the cause and outcomes of revolution: revolutionary situation and revolutionary outcome. He draws on these two components to better understand revolutions through the years of 1492-1992 and to explain a state’s motivation to mobilize. While he defines the two as “close kin,” the distinctions between the two are vital to his theory of revolution.

The concept of a revolutionary situation derived from Leon Trotsky’s belief in dual power. Trotsky’s belief “implies that a destruction of the social equilibrium has already split the state superstructure” (Trotsky, 1932). Tilly’s definition of the revolutionary situation “entails multiple sovereignty” (Tilly, 1993: p. 10), meaning two or more parties are needed to be successful in making claims to control the state or by the state. If an existing polity is in place, the parties exercise control over a significant part of the state. Through his structuralist point of view, he signifies that change within states’ structure creates revolutions. With a revolutionary situation, the structure is represented as the root, and what matters is the states’ environment. Such as the social process, according to Tilly, is the best predictor of what is bringing critical change which consists of multiple factors, like economics, political structure, and state culture. Further, he notes three crucial causes of convergence in a revolutionary situation (Tilly, 1993, p. 49-50):

1)      Appearance of a contender or a coalition of contenders advancing competing control of the state or at least parts of it.

2)     Committing to those claims by a significant segment of citizenship.

3)     Incapacity or unwillingness of rulers to suppress the alternative coalition and their claims.

According to Tilly, a revolutionary outcome centers around the transfer of state power. Specifically, from the “old regime” that held power before the period of multiple revolutionary outcomes represents the transfer of power from the state to the challengers who declared polity and came into control with the means of armed force. There are four causes for these outcomes as identified in Tilly’s theory (1993, p. 49-50):

1)     Defections of polity members.

2)     Armed forces acquired by revolutionary coalitions.

3)     Neutralization or defection by the regime’s armed force.

4)     Control of the state by members of a revolutionary coalition.

However, in Tilly’s theory, the two conditions of revolution must be separated in order to understand revolutions extensively.  The differentiation between the two are as follows:

1)     A basic split in polity which is represented as a deep revolutionary situation

2)     A large transfer of power which represented a serious revolutionary outcome

With these circumstances relevant to a better understanding of Tilly’s revolutionary theory, further examination of two case studies, The Iranian Revolution and The Arab Spring is necessary to understand his theory fully. These two revolutions use Tilly’s theory to understand better how both states experienced a revolutionary situation and the revolutionary outcome that followed or did not materialize.

The Iranian Revolution

According to Tilly’s theory, revolutions manifest under different circumstances that he refers to as “traffic jams” (Tilly, 1993: p. 8) because of the diverse components that lead to competition over control. The Iranian Revolution occurred from 1978-79. The revolution erupted over a deal the Iranian government made with Britain. Specifically, the British initiated the change of dynasties from Qajar to Pahlavi (Defronzo 1991). This alliance between the Pahlavi dynasty and the United Kingdom and the United States was perceived to weaken Muslim culture, and many feared it would lead to corruption. The Pahlavi Dynasty was responsible for this controversy by distributing wealth unevenly among classes with its large oil boom and land reform. The assumption held by Shah was that the reforms would forge a population favorable to his ruling. However, the opposite occurred and not only did his policies anger the traditionalists, led Ayatollah Khomeini, with secularization and land reform but also leftist organizations who were more in favor of democratic agency rather than denationalization of various government held companies (Defronzo 1991). The worsening condition of Shah’s assumed corruption and tone-deaf policies sparked frustration that led to revolution.

Under Tilly’s theory, the Iranian Revolution can be understood through great lengths because it follows the two essential conditions that Tilly notes, revolutionary situation, and revolutionary outcome. During the Iranian Revolution, The Shah Regime, the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini and the growth of leftist movements were the three sovereign movements that mobilized for total control of the state. The Shah regime and its moral corruption led Ayatollah Khomeini to mobilize against the Shah. The authoritative grip of the Shah also angered much of the middle class which favored political reform. In general, the disruption of social and economic patterns from the wealth of oil being disproportionate to the classes, difficulties for citizens to participate in politics, and the absence of Islam religion contributed to the mobilization (Defronzo 1991). As noted in Tilly’s theory, a state’s structure alters revolutions (Tilly 1993). Under the Iranian Revolution, the social and economic circumstances indicated what could become of this revolution.

Following Tilly’s theory, to meet his revolution definition, an outcome must occur to be considered a revolution. During the Iranian Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini launched what he called a “moral attack” on the Shah’s regime’s armed forces, as well as an economic drought through the protest of oil workers that would call for the neutralization of the regime’s armed forces. Four causes contribute to revolutionary outcomes. As seen under Ayatollah Khomeini, he used demonstrations to attract these results. In regard to him implementing a “moral attack,” he supported his strategy by explaining:

We must fight the soldier within the soldier’s hearts. Fight through martyrdom because the martyr is the essence of history. Let the army kill as many as it wants until the soldiers are shaken to their hearts by the massacres they have committed. The army will collapse (Defronzo, 315).

Ayatollah Khomeini’s peace-intended tactic delivered results as soldiers surrendered and joined the revolution. Along with Ayatollah Khomeini’s oil protests that were then crippling the economy, ensured the fallout of Shah’s regime and led to Ayatollah Khomeini taking control of the state. Using Tilly’s revolutionary outcome, the neutralization of armed forces is a characteristic that aligns with Tilly’s understanding of what revolutions represent. The Iranian revolution began because of social and economic issues that were disrupted due to political corruption that pushed people to demand and mobilize for change. As Tilly compares revolution to a traffic jam, different systems of the state were part of different circumstances that inevitably resulted in a revolution.

With the Iranian revolution behind it eventually led to another revolution, known as the Green Revolution. The Green Revolution took place in 2009, just after President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won the election. Tensions rose from this election after citizens believe that votes were fraudulent and began large protests. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s opponent believed that the new president’s interests and views did not appropriately serve modern Iran. Thus, the revolt against President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad persisted. The Mojeh Sabz (also known as The Green Revolution) began to occur.

As stated in Tilly’s revolutionary theory, two conditions must occur for this revolution to be legitimate. First, the revolutionary situation. In the Green Revolution, the Mojeh Sabz campaign developed and later grew into a great social movement. This social movement was rooted in citizens demanding reform and improved civil liberties. The Green Revolution had two sovereign parties, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Majeh Sabz fighting for control of the state, a condition Tilly defines as multiple sovereignty.

Still, this revolution lacked a revolutionary outcome. In Tilly’s theory, for a revolution to meet his definition, it requires four causes. Unfortunately, the Green Revolution meets none. As citizens demanded reform and leveraged social media as a platform that ultimately changed the state’s structure, the Mojeh Sabz never gained control, and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s regime did not neutralize or defect.

However, the Green Revolution aligns more with the next chapter’s theorist, Theda Skocpol, and her social revolution theory. As Skocpol theorized, social revolution peaks after social and political structures are redesigned and occur together. The Green Revolution follows this theory because of the mobilization that took place against President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad due to his inadequacies to maintain a modern Iran. The uprising occurred because this generation grew up under a new age of globalization that left Iranians well educated and in a position to demand change in their socio-political infrastructure with new reforms. Social media platforms were massive in this revolution, gaining momentum because of new-age technology that was crucial to Iran’s modernization because it increased attention towards the oppressive aspect of Iran. This revolution follows Skocpol’s theory more so than Tilly’s because it was framed around social and political circumstances challenged by the opposing classes calling for changes. However, similar to Tilly’s revolutionary outcome, the Green Revolution falls short of being successful under Skocpol’s theory of revolution. This failure is due to the circumstance that failed to lead to a successful charge for change, and there is little evidence that changes advocated for have become significant to consider it a successful social revolution under Skocpol theory.

The Arab Spring

The Arab Spring spread throughout several Middle Eastern and African countries between 2010-2012. In Tunisia, the uprising sparked due to popular demand to remove long-time leader Zine El Abidine Ben Ali from office and the economic deprivation most of the Tunisian population faced (Schraeder, Redissi, 2011). These events then ignited an uprising across several Arab and African states to remove leaders from positions of power. It is important to note that while Tilly’s theory effectively explains many of the revolutionary situations that occurred during the Arab Spring, however, he also falls short in several areas.

Tilly’s revolutionary outcome applies to the events in Tunisia and Egypt. In response to the “Jasmine Revolution,” which sparked due to the self-immolation of street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi, the Tunisian government incited violence against protesters. The components of Tilly’s revolutionary situation are present in Tunisia as “contenders advancing toward competing control of the state” and “incapacity of rulers to suppress the alternative coalition and their claims” (Tilly, 1993: p. 10). It is important to note that when the state uses violence in response to peaceful protesters, it is more than likely that otherwise neutral supporters will gravitate towards the opposition (Tilly, 1993). For example, the police brutality demonstrated against peaceful protesters during the 1960s civil rights movement in the United States caused major controversy nationwide. The brutality, shown in the form of police dogs and fire hoses against peaceful protesters, led many citizens previously neutral to shift their support to the civil rights cause. The violence first issued against demonstrators is evidence of the state’s incapacity to contain the demonstrations, which ultimately led to stepping down from power shortly after. In terms of Tunisia, Ben Ali ordered the state’s military to repress the protestors with deadly force as the movement grew. However, the military refused to do so and instead supported the peaceful protests. The Ben Ali family was only left with a meager sized presidential guard which was incapable to take control of the situation (Schraeder, Redissi, 2011). Thus, the situation yielded a revolutionary outcome as the citizenry removed the “old regime” of power and controlled the state. This transition follows another factor of Tilly’s theory of revolution. He states that gradual transition occurs between the old regime and the revolutionary coalition (Tilly 1993) and that is what exactly occurred in Tunisia. After the removal of the family and before the election of non-associated politicians the transition government was formed by old regime politicians. It would take a two-month gradual process before proper elections were held to elect members from the revolutionary coalition.

While what occurred in Tunisia alone is considered a revolution by Tilly’s definition, the Jasmine Revolution signified the beginning of the Arab Spring. In the days following Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s exit, protests broke out in Egypt. The factors of a revolutionary situation present in Tunisia were also present in Egypt; however, the path to a revolutionary outcome looked different. Similar to Tunisia much of the Egyptian population already felt economic deprivation and mass poverty (Korotayev, Shishkina, 2019). The state responded first by offering concessions to stop protests and used violence against demonstrators. Still, when protests persisted, President Hosni Mubarak lost the military’s support and left office 30 days later. His replacement would be a military junta (Korotayev, Shishkina, 2019). According to Tilly’s theory, the defection of armed forces signified a revolutionary outcome. A military council then assumed the responsibilities of government. However, unlike in Tunisia, the military council that assumed power was resistant to transferring power to an elected government and assumed violence against protestors. Ultimately, despite the outbreak of violence, the government was in the hands of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces and not democratic elections such as in Tunisia (Korotayev, Shishkina, 2019).

Beyond Tunisia and Egypt, Tilly’s theory falls short when looking at the other Arab Spring states such as Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, and Syria. While components of his revolutionary situation are present across the countries, revolutionary outcomes do not manifest. In Yemen, power was transferred from president Ali Abd Allah Salih to the vice president Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi without any change to the “old regime” of government. Similarly, the uprising in Bahrain did not result in a revolutionary outcome as the state stifled the revolution successfully. In Libya, the demonstrations against Muammar al-Qaddafi quickly escalated into a violent civil war. In the Egyptian and Tunisian, governments it did not because the military took the side of the protestors rather than the regime during the upheaval. Defection of the military is the radical difference between these regimes. With many different contenders or as Tilly would state the various sovereignties contending with one another (Tilly 1993), these groups created a drift based on diverse goals that resulted in a further violent revolution in Libya and Syria.

While Tilly’s theory can explain the revolutionary situation, his theory does not extend to explain why the revolution took place across several states. Theda Skocpol’s social revolution theory better explains each of these states’ international connections and why revolution spread throughout several Arab countries. She states in her work States and Social Revolutions that (SKOCPOL, 1979: P. 3)

Nor have social revolutions had only national significance. In some cases, social revolutions have given rise to models and ideals of enormous international impact and appeal – especially where the transformed societies have been large and geopolitically important.

Skocpol draws on the importance of transmission of revolution. In States and Social Revolutions, she quotes El Baki Hermassi in saying that revolutions “exert a demonstration effect beyond the boundaries of their country of origin, with a potential for triggering waves of revolution and counterrevolution both within and between societies” (1979,4). Her theory describes the wave of revolution that transcended one state’s boundaries, sweeping across several different countries within a short period. Tilly’s theory falls short in this manner by only explaining the revolution within the context of a single state structure.

Conclusion

Tilly’s theory of revolution contains many factors required to mobilize and define a revolution adequately. Revolutionary situations and outcomes are two defining factors that represent the significance of a proper understanding of revolutions’ causes and effects. These two components stand as a model of how revolutions form through a series of systems that inevitably lead to what is known as a revolutionary situation that then is followed by a revolutionary outcome. The chosen case studies represent Tilly’s connection to “traffic jams.” Each state had different structures that ranged in severity and circumstance that Tilly’s theory highlights. Tilly’s theory of revolution accounts for the nature of shifts in states’ power by examining the states’ systems that lead to the cause and effect of revolutions.

Works Cited

“Arab Spring: A Research & Study Guide.” Cornell University. https://guides.library.cornell.edu/c.php?g=31688&p=200752.

“Birmingham Campaign.” Stanford Research and Education Institute (King Encyclopedia). https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/birmingham-campaign.

James, DeFronzo. “The Iranian Revolution and Islamic Fundamentalism.” Essay. In Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, 291–339, 1991.

Korotayev, Andrey V., Shishkina, Alisa R. 2019 “Relative Deprivation as a Factor of Sociopolitical Destabilization: Toward a Quantitative Comparative Analysis of the Arab Spring Events” SAGE Journals 4: (2019) 190-213

Koser, Khalid. 2012. “Migration, Displacement and the Arab Spring: Lessons to Learn.” Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/migration-displacement-and-the-arab-spring-lessons-to-learn/.

Martin, Douglas. 2008. “Charles Tilly, 78, Writer and a Social Scientist, Is Dead.” New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/02/nyregion/02tilly.html.

Schraeder, Peter J., Redissi, Hamadi. “Ben Ali’s Fall.” Journal of Democracy 22, no.3 (2011): 5-19.

Skocpol, Theda. “Skocpol: States and Social Revolutions.” Adam R Brown. Last modified 1979. Accessed November 8, 2020. https://adambrown.info/p/notes/skocpol_states_and_social_revolutions.

Tilly, Charles. 1993a. European Revolutions 1492-1992. Blackwell Publishers.1993b. European Revolutions.

Trotsky, Leon. 1932. The History of the Russian Revolution.

Image Attribution

“Charles Tilly” by Shing Au-Yeung is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0